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SECTION A: Introduction  
1.1.1 Introduction 
After the end of the Cold War the world has witnessed what Samuel Huntington calls a wave 
of democratization, especially in the post-Soviet countries. This means that several countries 
have taken upon themselves the task of trying to implementing democracy and making their 
national realms more democratic. At least in name (Huntington 1991,Sørensen 2008). Some 
scholars have even called the 20
th
 century, especially the period after the Second World War, 
the golden age of democracy (Inglehart and Welzel 2009). Democracy is today seen as the 
most legitimate form of government in the world, as it is based on the people's right to choose 
and control their leaders. Not only so that the population can protect themselves against abuse 
from a governmental actor, but also so that they, to some extent, can control governmental 
spending. "No taxation without representation". So it is in the populations own interests that a 
process of democratization does not stop and experience a democratic backlash. However, 
even if this is the form of government which has had the most support and legitimacy around 
the world after the end of the Cold War, it has not been implemented everywhere. 
The biggest of the post-Soviet countries which tried to go through a democratic transition was 
Russia. Now, as Russia is one of the largest military powers in the world, the sole great power 
in the post communist area, and a major political player in three major regions of the world 
(Europe, the Middle East and East-Asia) its politics can affect a major number of countries. 
Russia is also one of the two major nuclear powers in the world, as well as it is one of the 
largest producers and exporters of oil and gas in the world. So as M. Steven Fish puts it “It is 
therefore not surprising that Russia has been the subject of great attention from the West” 
(Fish 2005 p. 2). 
Moreover, when I later in this thesis discuss the ongoing unrest in Russia, it is often in 
connection to the Russian democracy. And this often raise the question: what kind of 
democracy are we talking about then? There are several definitions of democracy, and a 
growing number of people emphasize that we need to distinguish between effective and 
ineffective democracies. These ineffective democracies are by some considered to be “sham” 
democracies which hides under terms such as: “electoral democracy” and “hybrid democracy” 
(Inglehart and Welzel 2009). Some people may take the definition of democracy for granted, 
but it is important for a scholarly study to specify what definition will be the point of 
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departure, or the goggles to use, to analyze the world, and in this case Russia. Yet, what I in 
this thesis will try to explain is not whether Russia is a democracy, even if it may be 
mentioned in connection with the theory in my analysis. 
Russia and several of the former members of either the Soviet Union (USSR) and or the 
Warsaw Pact went through a process of democratization in the early 1990s. Former Russian 
president Boris Yeltsin, with help from his domestic and foreign advisers, changed the 
political and economic system in the great country dramatically, almost overnight, using what 
some call a “shock therapy”. This meant trying to go from a planned economy to the making 
of a liberal market economy, which resulted in huge economic differences in the country. 
Some people, often in high government positions, got their hands on natural resources as gas 
and oil, or iron and nickel, which made them extremely wealthy. These people are today 
knows as oligarchs,  while others went through tough times barely hanging on (Hønneland 
2006, Fish 2005).  Nevertheless, the political system went from a one party system to a multi 
party system, and according to the constitution of 1993, Russia is a democratic state with a 
republican form of government based on the rule of law. However, these changes, both 
political and economic, had what some would agree to call catastrophic effects, leading to the 
collapse of the Russian ruble, and a democratic backlash in the late 90s and early 21
st
 century, 
especially after Putin rose to presidency and power. 
Thus what my thesis will try to explain is the following: When scholars around the world now 
talk about the Russian democratization process , they talk about a "Russian Backlash".  - 1) 
What is meant by this? 2) What are the main explanations of the phenomenon 3) And how do 
these explanations together contribute to our understanding of the Russian case?  In the 
thesis' analysis the last two questions will be given more attention than the first one. 
In the world today we can see several attempts to implement democracy after regime change 
and it could be claimed that most focus today is on the democratization processes in countries 
in Africa and the Middle-East. Moreover, the major focus on,- and the importance of, 
democracy and democratization could be said to come from the theory or thesis know as the 
"Democratic Peace Thesis". In fact, there is an almost universal consensus in the social 
sciences about the theory, which says that there is a link between democracy and peace. It 
claims that democracies do not fight each other. This has many explanations, some of which 
focus on the norms that democratic systems create, as checks and balances which make it 
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natural to resolve conflict in the same way as, internally in democracies, on the international 
arena. While other scholars focus on the structures and interdependence between democracies 
as the most important features of democracy, which supposedly secure peace and prosperity 
in our realm. These are some of the many reasons why several scholars and politicians have 
seen the spread of democracy to other parts of the world as important during the 20
th
 and  21
th
 
century. This is why a stop and recession in a process of democratization is such a cause of 
concern from the rest of the world. However, it is worth mentioning that the studies dealing 
with this thesis also present different results depending on the criteria they set for what is to 
count as war etc. Yet, this kind of thinking is not new to the twentieth and twenty-first 
centuries. Thoughts like this were already presented by Immanuel Kant in the 18
th
 century. He 
already then foresaw a “zone of peace” between America and Europe, or what others call the 
western world or civilization. (Kant 2002, Gleditsch 1997 p.310) 
Moreover, democracy and Russia is an exciting topic as we just have witnessed unrest and 
protests in Russia after the elections for parliament towards the end of 2011 and the 
presidential election in March 2012 where Putin won  with 64 percent of the total votes. In 
other words by such a wide  margin that there was only one round of voting, as this means 
that he had over 50 percent of the total votes in his favor, and he had an absolute majority of 
the votes. Now as some of the data which will be presented in my thesis show there have been 
several irregularities connected to the past elections in Russia, after the end of the Cold War. 
Furthermore, we can actually read quotes by Vladimir Putin’s right hand man, former 
president Dimitrij Medvedev, saying before the presidential election of 2012 that Russia and 
its political system need change and that the current has served its purpose. Also the Soviet 
Union’s last leader Mikhail Gorbatsjov was taking part in the demonstrations after the Duma 
(the Russian parliament) elections in December 2011, and publically asked Putin not to run 
for president, and rather retire from politics after already serving three periods in office (two 
as president and one as prime minister). (NTB)  
With the  Democratic Peace Thesis in mind, it is no wonder why the form of government in 
this major atomic power is an important and  interesting topic. If one accepts the notion of a 
universal peace between democracies the democratic part of the international community  has 
huge interests in continuing to promote democracy in Russia. When it comes to the case of 
Russia, a backlash could be seen as a threat for peace not only in the West, but also in the 
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world. Therefore as a student of peace in the program; Peace, and conflict transformation, and 
a citizen of one of Russia's neighboring countries, I consider the topic of Russia's 
democratization and  democratic backlash after the end of the Cold War an interesting and a 
relevant one. 
As far as, the structure of this thesis is concerned, first there will be a theory chapter in which 
theories of democracy and democratization will be used to explain what is meant by a 
democratic backlash. Further on the theory chapter will present theories explaining why such 
backwards steps in  the process of democratization may happen, divided into categories based 
on cultural and historical arguments and explanations, economic explanations, and 
explanations based on aspects of sharing or lack of sharing between the political institutions 
themselves, and political society's relationship to civil society. In the following chapter the 
methods of study will be presented, before I will go on to discuss the data collected in an 
analysis with the use of  the theories presented in the theory chapter.  During this analysis I 
will answer the three questions that are asked. It is worth stating that the two last questions 
that I ask in the problem statement, I will not discuss the problems and strengths with the 
different explanatory theories, rather I will try to show how a multidisciplinary approach can 
create a wider understanding of such a process as the one in Russia. Finally there will be a 














SECTION B: Theory 
2.1.1Theory 
In the first part this chapter I will try to establish some understandings of the concept 
democracy, based on some major approaches to the term. What will be presented is how 
scholars that debate the "Russian backlash" define the term democracy, what criteria have to 
be met, so that one can talk about a process of democratization or a "backlash". Secondly, I 
will try to explain what is meant by a democratic backlash and how this is connected to 
democratization and democracy. At the end of the chapter some of the general explanations 
for a failure to democratize and how one can experience a backlash will be presented, which I 
will use as my main tools for the analysis and the discussion.  
2.1.2 Democracy 
There are several understandings or definitions of democracy. However, the simplest one is 
maybe the one that was used in the city states of Ancient Greece. The word democracy 
originates from two Greek words: “Demos” which means people, and “kratos” which 
translates as rule. In other words democracy is “rule by the people” (Sørensen 2008).  At this 
point it is worth mentioning that I am aware that even if one connects the Ancient Greeks to 
democracy, and maybe regards Ancient Greece as the cradle of democracy, the political 
system was not based on a universal suffrage. The Greek city states where highly divided so 
when one talks about the people, one only refers to  a small part of society. However, it was 
where the liberal democracy which we know from today's society came from.  
Nevertheless, today scholars talk about democracy as something more than just rule by the 
people. We often link democracy to liberal values, and dived it in to two categories: civil and 
political freedom, or liberty. One could also say that the democratic tradition we follow is 
about putting restraints on the political authority (Sørensen 2008). This has led to what I later 
in this thesis define as broad and narrow approaches to the term democracy.  
The approaches mentioned above are the different goggles a scholar put on to analyze a case. 
One could use the approaches as a tool for conceptualizing the term democracy, which 
importantly define and put a regime in to a classification. This is so that we can put countries 
in to, or outside of, the "box" or definition we use. To put it in the way of M. Steven Fish, our 
understandings of a concept, and in this case democracy, is important to clarify because 
people can have different conditions , expectations and measurements and criteria for the 
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same concept. And if this is so it can be difficult to compare cases. Take for example the word 
revolution. If one defines revolution as an overthrow of a regime with the use of violence, the 
regime change which is often called a revolution in Hungary would not fit this definition.  
However, the Russian revolution fits. This example serves as an explanation of why it is 
important to later on define what I will use as the definition of what constitutes as a 
democracy. (Fish 2005 p. 15) 
As mentioned above democracy means rule by the people and democracy has through time 
been given different meanings depending on time and space. One can find narrow concepts 
like the Greek democracy or broader definitions of democracy like the liberal democracy. The 
latter is what we today often connect to the word. To understand this I will look at two 
different approaches to democracy. Nevertheless, before I move on it is important to say that 
these are not the only two understandings of democracy. There are still plenty of different 
variations and models of democracy;  however these are the ones this project will present as 
two competing understandings of what constitutes as a democracy.  
These two models, or concepts, of democracy are not chosen randomly. They are referred to 
by several scholars who often create their own understanding  of democracy in line with these 
definitions. This will be clarified in later in the thesis. (See Dahl, Cohen, Fish, Inglehart and 
Welzel, Linz and Stepan, Sørensen and Saward). 
2.1.3 The narrow concept of democracy 
The first definition of democracy that I will look at was formulated by Joseph Schumpeter. He 
uses a definition which is already referred to as a narrow concept of democracy and it needs 
some explaining. According to Schumpeter’s theory democracy is a mechanism for choosing 
and changing the political leadership. Citizens of a democracy are given the opportunity to 
choose between rivaling political parties or leaders. In Schumpeter’s mind the competition for 
political power is mainly done by elite individuals or groups in the society. This means that 
they control resources that make it possible for them to fight for legislative and executive 
power. The overall population will therefore be voting for these different elites who they find 
most eligible to rule over them. However, between elections all decisions are made by the 
politicians who the citizens have chosen to lead their country. So in this narrow definition of 
democracy what is important is being able to choose and elect new, or re-elect old politicians, 
not being part of the decision-making per se. (Sørensen 2008 and Saward 2003) 
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2.1.4 The broader definition of democracy 
Compared to Schumpeter’s approach to democracy, the definition presented by Robert A. 
Dahl is a broader one. He claims that democracy is something more than just being able to 
choose leaders through elections. Dahl’s theory says that a key part of being a democracy is 
that the regime considers their citizens as political equals. This means that the citizens must 
have the opportunity to:  
“(1) Formulate their preferences, (2) signify their preferences to their fellow citizens and the 
government by individual and collective action, and (3) have their preferences weighed 
equally in the conduct of the government.” (Sørensen 2008 p. 13). 
Furthermore, these opportunities need to be realized through institutional guarantees from the 
government. And Dahl presents seven major points which the governmental institutions need 
to guarantee: 
1. Elected officials. Control over government decisions about policy is constitutionally vested in elected 
officials.  
2. Free and fair elections. Elected officials are chosen in frequent and fairly conducted elections in which 
coercion is comparatively uncommon.  
3. Inclusive suffrage. Practically all adults have the right to vote in the election of officials. 
4. Right to run for office. Practically all adults have the right to run for elective offices in the 
government, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for the suffrage. 
5. Freedom of expression. Citizens have a right to express themselves without the danger of severe 
punishment on political matters broadly defined, including criticism of officials the government, the 
regime, the socioeconomic order, and the prevailing ideology. 
6. Alternative information. Citizens have a right to seek out alternative sources of information. Moreover, 
alternative sources of information exist and are protected by laws. 
7. Associational autonomy. To achieve various rights, including those listed above, citizens also have a 
right to form relatively independent associations or organizations, including independent political 
parties and interest groups.  
(Sørensen 2008 p. 13) 
The first point listed above means that the politicians elected by the people decide, not for 
example a monarch appointed based on birth rights. As to the second one, I simply understand 
as the elections are free and fair, and without the use of force. The third point is concerned 
with having the right to vote and therefore participating in making the decision concerning 
who will lead the country. This means that all people, regardless of sex, have the right to vote. 
However, most countries have an age limit which one need to exceed if one is to be allowed 
to vote, and seen as accountable or responsible. In Norway this is the year one turns 18. The 
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forth point discusses having the right to run for offices like governor or in parliament etc, in 
other words that these offices are not reserved for a specific part of society. The fifth point 
listed by Dahl is freedom of expression. In a democracy the institutions of a government need 
to guarantee citizen’s rights to express themselves, meaning that they can be critical towards 
the government and their officials and the leading paradigms, without being afraid of 
punishment in any form. So the main point here is really that people should be able to express 
their opinions without fear. Further, the sixth point listed is here understood as not only 
having access to information in general like the Internet or different media, but also having 
access to other religious writings from other beliefs or philosophies of life. I also understand 
this as having the right to access information which is not state dominated or constructed, for 
real not only in name. The last and seventh point is then of course having the right  to 
organize people who believe in the same things be it religious or political.  
Moreover, “the seven conditions cover three main dimensions of political democracy – 
competition, participation, and civil and political liberties”. (Sørensen 2008 p.14).  So, when 
these conditions are met we have a regime which Dahl defines as a liberal democracy. These 
aspects together covers what I will call political openness. 
 
2.1.5 Liberal democracy vs. a narrow definition 
Compared to the broader definition of democracy, Schumpeter also opens for competition and 
participation. However, competition in a democracy like the one presented by Schumpeter 
requires recourses and is therefore restricted to the elites. Participation is also possible but it is 
connected to being able to vote and choose leadership, not to be part of a democratic dialog, 
because between elections the elite in power decide how to run the country. Not to say that 
there cannot be a form for dialog, this is just understood it in this thesis as marginalized by the 
narrow approach and will therefore not be understood as a definition of a liberal democracy.  
Furthermore, this thesis focuses mostly on the notion of liberal democracy. The reason why I 
concentrate on this is because this is now the most common understanding of democracy. 
Even if the major point or what one to some extent can understand as the most important 
feature of democracy is voting, scholars now understand democracy as something more than 
just this. Democracy as a form of governance that includes more than just voting is maybe not 
so hard to agree upon. Dahl and others identifies this as the essence of democracy: “The core 
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of political democracy has three dimensions: competition, participation, and civil and 
political liberties. When we study the status of democracy in a specific country, the first step 
is to look for these three elements”. (Sørensen 2008 p. 27). Moreover this means that it is not 
possible to call a country a democracy, or at least a liberal one, without including all these 
three dimensions. Other scholars like Ingelhart and Welzel claims that democracies that do 
not include these dimensions are “sham” democracies which hide under the name of 
democracy with a twist that includes their own version or understanding (Ingelhart and 
Welzel 2009). The figure below illustrates this phenomenon: 
 
Competition 
         South Africa (Apartheid) Denmark 
 
        Myanmar/ Burma   USSR 
      Participation 
Source: Modified from Georg Sørensen Democracy and Democratization 2008 p. 16.  
The figure shows us how a regime can include parts of what we understand as a liberal 
democracy and at the same time fail to open for other parts which we see as important 
features of democracy. As an example we can look at South Africa under the apartheid 
regime. The country was presented as a democracy, they had competition, yet the political 
arena was not open for everybody. In the other end of the scale the former Soviet Union had 
almost universal participation in their realm, there was, however no competition for power as 
there was only one party. The goal of a democracy must therefore be to have both 
participation and competition. 
So the key feature of what is now the most common understanding of democracy is that there 
is meaningful competition between individuals and groups (parties) for executive power and 
positions of government. And that there is a system of inclusive participation; this means that 
no major social group is excluded from participating in the competition for power. This also 
means that there regularly is a somewhat free and fair elections, and that the government 
guarantees their citizens civil and political liberties like freedom of speech. Thus when 
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scholars attempt to find out if a specific country is a (liberal) democracy these are the key 
features we look for. (Sørensen 2008 p. 14). 
Moreover, why do I use this definition? It is important to specify why the thesis will focus 
exactly on Dahl's definition, and it is because it is the most common understanding of what 
constitutes as a democracy. The basic seven points presented by Dahl are even used as the 
basis for measuring the level of democracy and freedom by major statistical research 
programs like Freedom House's index called Freedom in the World, and referred to and used 
by several of the scholars which I refer to. (See: Fish 2005, Sørensen 2008, Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005) This also means that the importance of this definition is connected to the fact 
that the seven aspects which are mentioned by Dahl can over time tell us something about a 
process of democratization. Based on the seven points it is possible to identify if the process 
has stopped, are moving forward or backwards. 
2.2.1 Democratization and democratic backlash 
In the section above some general features for what constitutes as a liberal democracy  have 
been established. Whether Russia meets these criteria for being a liberal democracy will be 
answered at a later stage. What will be presented  in the next section of the chapter is what 
scholars mean when they talk about a  democratic backlash, and how this is connected to 
democratization. 
2.2.2 Towards Democracy 
According to Ambrosio (2009) the literature dealing with democratization has mainly been 
concerned with  the positive progress and the cases of successful democratic consolidation, 
rather than the cases of democratic failure. This is why most of the theories which I use in my 
master thesis are mainly focused on processes which promote democracy. I will therefore use 
the theories to say something about backlashes based on the aspects or features which the 
theories highlight as important for a successful process of democratization. Nevertheless, this 
may not become a major problem because to understand what a democratic backlash means 
one first has to understand what is meant by the notion of democratization. As I will come 
back to in this thesis; it is when the process of democratization stops and moves backwards 
that one can measure and speak of a backlash. 
Democratization can be said to happen when a non-democratic regime is undertaking a 
transition towards a more democratic system. So when we see shifts towards greater 
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democracy we have democratization. According to what is presented by Sørensen's model 
earlier in the thesis, I  understand democratization as happening either when there is increased 
competition (liberalization, yet not necessarily in the economic respect) or increased 
participation. (Sørensen 2008 p. 16). So democratization can happen both when a regime or a 
system becomes more open for political competition, or more open for participation from the 
public. 
  
Figure 2: from Robert A. Dahl Polyarchy 1991 
In the figure from Dahl we can understand that a shift towards more liberalization, or more 
inclusiveness, represents democratization. However, the main goal must always be to reach 
what Dahl calls a Polyarchy or what others call a consolidated democracy, a democratic 
system based on both participation and competition for power. (Dahl 1991, Sørensen 2008).  
Moreover, to understand this we can say that the goal of a democratic process must be to 
establish a consolidated democracy which respects the values of a liberal democracy. A 
regime is a consolidated democracy when: 
 - Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national actors, 
 be it social, economic, political or institutional, spend significant resources attempting to 
 achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or turning to violence or foreign 
 intervention to secede from the state. 
 -Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the 
 belief that democratic procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life 
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 in a society such as theirs and when the support for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or 
 less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
 -Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces 
 alike, throughout the territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of 
 conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process. 
         (Linz & Stepan 1996 .p 6) 
Furthermore, what Linz and Stepan highlight is that it is impossible to reach the goal of a 
consolidated democracy  without having a society which respects the values which in this 
thesis are presented as parts of a liberal democracy. They claim that for a regime to become a 
consolidated democracy some conditions need to be in place to reinforce the regime. First, 
there must be conditions in place for a free civil society. Second there must be a autonomous 
political society.  Third, there must be a rule of law to ensure the legal guarantees for citizens, 
so that even if they support a part of  the society other than the ruling one they need not be 
afraid as long as they follow the rules of the game. Forth, there must be a functioning state 
bureaucracy which is usable by any new government. And fifth there must be an economic 
society which is ensured by governmental institutions. (Linz &Stepan 1996 p.7) 
Now, civil society means an arena where self-organizing groups, movements, and individuals 
mostly autonomous from the state articulate values, interests, solidarities and accusations. 
This means that civil society can include groupings or movements like for example; women's 
groups, religious groups, intellectual organizations or trade unions. The idea is that this civil 
society can be a social force with the capacity to mobilize for demonstrations or strikes 
against for example military -led regimes or other forms of authoritarian regimes. An example 
of how civil society can work as a social and political force is the demonstrations after the 
presidential elections in Ukraine in 2004, which lead to the election victory of the opposition 
leader Viktor Jusjtsjenko. What happened is that several irregularities were observed during 
the election, and after major civil demonstrations and pressure from the international 
community Ukraine held not only two but three rounds of election between the two major 
candidates. (NTB; dramaet i ukraina). However civil society in authoritarian regimes is often 
marginalized or made illegal. (Linz & Stepan 1996). 
A political society is an arena where different groups contest and compete for the legitimate 
right to exercise control over the public and the state apparatus. The core features of a 
political society include having; political parties, elections, electoral rules, elected political 
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leadership and a governmental legislature, which is in itself elected to monitor and control the 
democratically elected government. This can take different forms, such as for example 
presidencies, semi-presidencies and parliamentary rule. Nevertheless, regardless of the form 
of democratic government all these features are needed for a sustainable political society. 
(Linz & Stepan 1996). 
Furthermore, all the significant actors, be it parts of civil society or political society, need to 
respect and uphold the rule of law. Because democracy is a form of government which 
respects and protect citizens' rights, and these are guaranteed and protected by the rule of law, 
where as in the eyes of the laws everyone are equal. 
The final condition presented by Linz and Stepan is the arena which they call the economic 
society. This is the constant mediation between the market and the government. Because 
according to Linz and Stepan the market in a consolidated democracy is never purely free, 
conditions and restraints where the actors of the market operate are controlled by government 
laws and regulations. At the same time, as the state often has ownership in parts of the market, 
the market in itself is important for the state and private revenue and production so that the 
economy can go round. (Linz & Stephan 1996). 
So, democratization is happening when a regime moves towards more competition for power 
or more participation from the public, and the ultimate goal is a consolidated democracy 
based on the respect and uphold of liberal democratic values. Then what is meant by a 
"democratic backlash" ?  
2.2.3 Democratic backlash 
The easy way of answering this is to say that if one looks for the criteria from above as signs 
of democratization, seeing the opposite as a democratic backlash. In other words a democratic 
backlash happens when the democratic process stops and takes steps backwards, from more 
competition or participation towards less. When a regime moves away from what Dahl calls a 
"Polyarchy" (see the second figure), and towards one of the other classifications.  
Measuring a shift like this is problematic because it can be hard to quantify democracy and 
democratization. However, as Huntington claims the two dimensions, created by Dahl 
(contestation and participation), make it possible to judge to what extent a regime is 
democratic, to compare it with other regimes or systems, and maybe most importantly, to 
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analyze whether systems are becoming more or less democratic (Huntington 1991).  There 
have in fact been several attempts to quantitatively measure the degree of democracy in the 
world and in specific countries, in accordance to the points listed by Dahl. As several scholars 
dealing with this kind of work refers to the Freedom House Index as the best tool for looking 
at shifts and trends connected to democracy, especially those who use Dahl's definition of 
democracy based on political rights and civil liberties, it will also be used to show trends in 
this thesis. (See Sørensen 2008, Fish 2005, Inglehart and Welzel 2005). 
Measuring the phenomenon in social science has become widespread and a large part of the 
social sciences. During the 90’s it became normal to categorize and grade regimes according 
to the levels of democracy. This was used to compare cases of democratization (Pridham 
2001). And this means that it has also become natural to try to measure democracy. 
Huntington claims Robert A. Dahl's seven points and three dimensions have in fact made it 
possible to  measure democracy. One of the surveys which try to measure this is the Freedom 
House index: freedom in the world.  
The survey tries to measure the dimensions: competition and participation, political rights and 
civil liberties. Each category is ranked on a seven-point scale which means that the highest 
ranking countries are 1-1's while the lowest are 7-7's. This means that the index tries to 
measure between semi-democratic and semi-authoritarian regimes and fully authoritarian (7-
7) and fully democratic ones (1-1). (Sørensen 2008). 
The Freedom House Index classifies countries with the average rating between 1 and 2.5 to be 
free, those with an average between 3-5.0 as partly free, and those rating from 5.5-7 as not 
free. 
However, as all the scholars using this survey point out, the measurement of democracy is 
highly complex and therefore imprecise (Fish 2005, Sørensen 2008). Freedom House 
estimates political rights and civil liberties in each country based on 7 points;  the first three 
for political rights and the last four to measure the civil ones: 
1) electoral processes, 2) political pluralism and participation, 3) functioning government.  4) 
freedom of expression and belief, 5) associational and organizational rights, 6) rule of law, 
and 7) personal autonomy. In all participants of this research are asked 29 questions which 
together creates the combination (Freedom House Index's checklist questions). 
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Moreover, measuring democracy based on this list and then ranking countries both are 
complex and difficult. As Georg Sørensen writes in his book Democracy and 
Democratization: 
 "The Freedom House questions illustrate the potential problems involved with 
 measuring democracy. First, the problem of conceptualization what are the specific 
 attributes of democracy and how are they related to each other? Second, the problem 
 of best possible estimation or measurement of these attributes; third, the problem of 
 aggregation, that is, of recombining the various measurers into an overall evaluation 
 of democracy" (Sørensen 2008 p.19) 
Furthermore, what is mentioned is the fact that even several of the countries which end up 
with the best ranking are very different from one another. For example the United States, 
Botswana, Denmark, Japan etc. all these have different political systems like parliamentary 
and two-party systems, political culture, socioeconomic environments  and so on. What more 
is mentioned by some scholars is that the three dimensions; free, partly free and not free are 
insufficient for describing these differences. Especially when it comes to countries which 
have some but not all of the democratic features (Sørensen 2008). 
Nevertheless, for analytical purposes Dahl's definition of democracy and his seven points 
make it possible, to a certain degree, to measure democracy based on the three dimensions: 
competition, participation and civil and political liberties. When a scholar tries to study the 
status of democracy in a given country these are the dimensions he or she looks at.  Therefore 
the Freedom House Index is a good tool to use when trying to do so. Yet, the world is so 
complex that it maybe does not  grasp every aspect of democracy (Sørensen 2008). 
So, the main focus of the theory dealing with democratization, and democratic backlashes, is 
the changes in regimes. Either towards greater or lesser democracy. Now there is a debate 
inside the scholarly literature about the balance between external and internal explanations for 
the changes. However as Ambrosio, a scholar focused on external reasons for these changes, 
himself says; "Certainly, a conductive domestic environment plays a necessary role in any 
democratic opening, transition, or consolidation. Without the proper democratic conditions 
within a country democracy will invariably fail. However, democratic outcomes are also 
heavily influenced by the international level" (Ambrosio 2009 p. 11). So even if democratic 
processes can be influenced by external factors, what Ambrosio presents is precisely why  this 
thesis mainly focuses on internal causes for a democratic backlash, and explanations for this. 
20 
 
2.3.1 Different approaches to failed democratization 
In the parts above it has been established what features one looks for when trying to analyze 
whether  a regime is a liberal democratic one. It has also been explained what is meant both 
by democratization and most importantly a democratic backlash. What will be presented now 
is theories trying to explain why such democratic backlashes happen, or which features that 
need to be established to secure a successful democratization process so that a regime can 
become a consolidated democracy.  
2.3.2 Political culture and democratic backlashes 
One of the approaches which deals with what is needed to complete and consolidate a 
democratization process is based on the need for a democratic culture. In other words, it is 
claimed that to have a successful process of democratization a country needs to establish a 
common democratic culture, if not one risks a backlash. 
Furthermore, culture is a broad term, so I need to specify what is meant by a democratic 
culture. First, a culture can be said to be a common set of traditions, norms, history and 
language. And these traditions and norms shape both political and economical behavior in 
different societies. It has been said that socioeconomic development bring along systematic 
changes. However cultural traditions and norms do not disappear overnight. At the same time 
as economic prosperity is said to make it possible to predict changes in culture towards 
greater respect for liberal values, the opposite is said to account for economic collapse.  
(Inglehart and Welzel 2005 p. 20). 
Political culture will in this case understood as the common traditions, beliefs and norms 
taken for granted in a country's political sphere, meaning how for example the political 
culture values the distribution of power in political life. Whether power is and should be 
divided equally between different institutions, or if all power should be centered around one 
man or institution. It does not mean that it has to be either equally distributed or only focused 
on one institution, however one of the aspects of political culture connected to the values of  
"power sharing", or I could even use the term balance of power in government. An example 
of two distinct political cultures could be the feudal society in Europe before the Peace at 
Westphalia, where all power was divided between several authorities including the king and 
the church; and after the Peace in Westphalia when all power was given to one sovereign 
(Ruggie 1993). Another example can maybe be the change of political culture when the kings 
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of Europe lost their "divine" right to rule as they pleased over their sovereign territories, while 
they lost power to popular rule and parliament. Moreover, after bloody revolutions like the 
French and the American the system which one identifies as the start of the modern 
democracy begun to develop. 
A democratic culture could then be understood as a community which understands and 
respects basic democratic values. What constitutes as these democratic values could be 
debated, however,  there is a broad consensus between many western scholars as to what these 
values are. They are in fact often connected to, or similar to the content in Robert A. Dahl's 
seven points mentioned earlier. A democratic culture could be seen as the respect for a strong 
civil society, a political society based on free and inclusive elections and the rule of law 
(Dahl, Linz & Stepan, Inglehart and Welzel). When both the population and the institutions of 
a country respects these values a stable liberal democracy can be developed. 
Moreover, one of the points made by Inglehart and Welzel is that institutions which formally 
respect these values cannot alone guarantee that a country becomes democratic. Also the 
population needs to become one with the democratic culture and respect the value of self 
expression and other liberal and democratic values. We can maybe understand this in the way 
that there need to be a general respect both from the top and down, as well as bottom -up.  
Furthermore,  liberal democracy is unlikely to be established if it exists in a culture dominated 
by survival values. In other words if the common values prioritize values like; economic 
growth or military security, and therefore give less priority to democratic values they become 
subordinate  and it will become easier for a charismatic leader to strengthen a authoritarian 
rule by use of such threat perceptions.  So for a democracy to become consolidated there need 
to be a kind of a hermeneutic process where both the population and the institutions together 
create a democratic culture. One cannot be focused only on the elite- or institutions, because 
the public or masses are not only spectators in a democracy, and in a process leading towards 
it (Inglehart and Welzel p. 156 and p. 158). This also supports the theory that democracy 
cannot be externally imposed. For a democracy to get foothold in as "the only game in town" 
it needs to be internally owned, and if it does not a backlash may occur. 
Nevertheless, what is mentioned above also strengthens the theory saying that a democratic 
culture cannot be created without socioeconomic development as well. Because without 
development logically the most important values, for the population and thus also for the 
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institutions, become what I in the paragraph above called survival values. But becoming a rich 
country does not alone create democracy; if it was so, oil-rich countries should have become 
democratic, and  it is not the case. What is meant by mentioning socioeconomic development 
is that changes in economics can create different cultural needs, from what I called survival 
values to self- expression or liberal and democratic values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  
Some explanations of democratic development presented by Huntington are based on; social, 
economic, and cultural factors. As he claims that these factors can all operate, often in 
conflicting ways, to either facilitate the creation of democracy or to sustain authoritarianism 
(Huntington 1991 p. 39). What I understand out of Huntington's reflections is that for example 
the existing culture within a regime, or a country, can prohibit the development of democracy. 
For example, if the tradition is that one man or woman rules, and he alone can announce the 
successor, then this can work against democratic development and sustain the old ways, 
which in turn results in a democratic recession and a full backlash. 
What has been presented in this section of the thesis is that there are different political 
cultures, and some scholars claim that to reach a consolidated democracy, a democratic 
culture needs to be in place. This means that there needs to be a belief that democratic norms 
and traditions are the best way to rule a country. A democratic culture is then based values 
similar to Dahl's seven points, which cover free and fair election, electoral cycles, respect for 
the rule of law and a strong civil society and the possibility to a pluralistic political society. 
Yet, maybe the most important point in this section is that the culture needs to be adopted at 
all levels of society. If not democracy will lose its legitimacy and a democratic backlash will 
occur. There needs to be a "hermeneutic" relationship between the public or the mass 
population, the elites in society and in the institutions themselves, which means that all these 
parts of public life can affect and change one another. 
2.3.3 Democratization, economic development and the possibility for a backlash 
In  this part of the theory chapter the thesis' focus will be on theory which tries to explain 
democratization and the failure to democratize connected to economic development. 
However, in this part it will also become clear that scholars do not agree on economic 




Scholars like Burkhart and de Soysa have claimed that liberalization of the market has a 
stronger effect on democratization than the other way around (Fish 2005). They claim that 
opening up the economy for foreign direct investment has a positive effect on democracy and 
democratization. Moreover, they claim that this kind of investment is independent from 
factors like urbanization, historical and institutional factors. Burkhart and de Soysa claims 
that the poor countries have much to gain from interdependence between them and the  rich 
ones. As I understand one of the major positive factors is that foreign investment brings with 
it wealth which otherwise would not be in the domestic economy (Burkhart and de Soysa 
2003). 
Economic development does also, according to Huntington, appear to promote democracy and 
democratization. In the case of increasing industrialization, society itself will become more 
complex and diverse which becomes difficult for an authoritarian regime to control. 
Moreover, economic growth creates wealth and power outside the state and the authoritarian 
elites, which give way for and creates demand from others to be part of decision making. An 
example of this could be the bourgeois and their part before and during the French revolution 
(Palmer, Colton and Kramer 2002). 
However, this is connected to what can be seen as a change in the social structure of society. 
As already presented  economic well being changes the values and attitudes of a country's 
citizens. If the citizens foresee economic development and the basic needs are met it increases 
interpersonal trust, life satisfaction and gives possibility to increase competence and education  
which in turn according to Huntington correlates positively with democratic institutions. 
(Huntington 1991). 
Moreover, economic development promotes expansion of the middle class, which some see as 
an important feature of democracy. It is said that if there is no middle class there can be no 
democracy. Liberalization creates economic development, which again lead to a more highly 
educated public and a larger middle class, which again creates a civic culture based on trust, 
satisfaction and expertise, that last creates support for democratization (Huntington 1991 p. 
69). 
In a liberal market economy the basic model is based on an economy which transfer economic 
power from producers to consumers. In a basic model of such a market there is total openness, 
which means that information is available for everyone, the idea is that there will be several 
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small producers which compete for the same costumers in the market. This will keep the 
prizes low because the model claims this to be cost effective. Scholars that proclaim the need 
for liberalization in countries that go through a process of democratization think in the same 
terms when it comes to competition for political power (Åslund 2002). 
Adam Przeworski calls this thinking Democratic Capitalism. What he means is that capitalism 
is a phenomenon based on exchange and  a division of labor and capital in a system where 
production is oriented towards the needs of others. This is a system where the producers 
cannot survive without the consumers who will buy the product. Workers sell their labor to a 
producer who profits on the sale of the products.  Competition is the most important word 
here. At the same time as one opens up for competition in the market, competition for power 
will begin because of the economic power given to the owners of capital. They will demand to 
have a say in government constraints and regulations over the market and the owners of 
capital (Przeworski 1991). Feudal society where political and economic power was the 
domain of the noble's and the church can serve as an illustration here. Every man was not 
equal in the eyes of God, nor were they equal in face of the law. However, when the feudal 
structures in Europe caved in, it gave way for other groups to be part of political and 
economical affairs. As the Americans said during their revolution against their English rulers, 
"No taxation without representation". 
At the same time, during what I understand as a hermeneutic process where capital owners get 
more power over government decisions vis-a-vis the old political elites, the idea is that the 
middle class will demand to be heard as well. Creating a possibility for elites to run for 
elections and compete over the support of the middle class. The logic is based on the fact that 
the production, investment and profit are regulated by constraints given by the government, 
and it is through these constraints workers can pursue their interests. In a democracy, even in 
a democracy like Schumpeter describes, citizens can express their claims to goods and 
services. Even if citizens do not have immediate rights to the products produced, they can 
direct the organization of production through the political system, and the allocation of profit 
thorough government regulations (Przeworski 1985 p. 11). Moreover, if one thinks in these 
lines  which Przeworski calls democratic capitalism; politicians, or elites, will compete for 
popular support in similar ways as producers compete for consumers. 
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Furthermore, if the government and it's officials are in fact dominated by groups with more 
resources than others, then the middle class as presented above  create and become the civil 
society. And during a fight against authoritarianism, or in case of a process of democratization 
these two parts of society, the owners of capital and the labor forces, need to be united. 
However, after the end of a repressing regime these two need to divide and become 
competitors. Nevertheless, there is a fine line in such a process because if they divide too 
early the outcome is likely to;  "repeat the experiences of South Korea, where the rivalry 
between two anti-authoritarian presidential candidates- rivalry that was personal but also 
regional and economic- permitted electoral victory for the candidate associated with 
dictatorship. If they do not divide at all, the new regime will be a mirror image of the old one: 
not representative, not competitive. This is the danger facing several European countries: that 
the revolution will end up being only anticommunist, not democratic" (Przeworski 1991 p. 
89). 
To sum this all up, the theory say that to have a successful process of democratization there is 
a need to establish a market based on free trade and competition. This will remove power 
from the traditional elites and transfer it to an economic elite. Although, the traditional and the 
economical elite may actually be the same group, however opening the market up for new 
producers will create a possibility for a shift in power at least over time. Moreover, what I 
understand as one of the major points in Przeworski's analogy is that when creating a liberal 
economy the producers compete for consumers, this will be adopted by the political system, 
which allocates power to the middle class as they can demand to have their interests 
addressed. Allocation is the main focus here. I understand it as if there is no allocation of 
resources to other parts of society than the political elite, during a process of democratization, 
it will result in a backlash as all power stays in the same place as before. 
Now there is a debate whether economical liberalization best is to be done gradually, or 
through what has come to be known as "shock-therapy". There are examples of both ways of 
doing it in the post-Soviet bloc. American scholars had the idea during the "third wave" that a 
leap to free market liberalization through "shock-therapy" would strengthen the transition and 
process towards democracy (Cohen 2000). "In some countries rapid growth or economic 
rescission forces regimes either to liberalize or intensify repression. Either way, both 
weakened authoritarianism" (Huntington 1991 p. 59).  And during a gradual process of 
democratization "....groups as the military, traditional economic elites, and leading 
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politicians may insist that the transition toward democracy include acceptance of a set of 
agreements or political pacts that define vital areas of interests for the elites" (Sørensen 2008 
p. 70). It means that "In sum, various forms of elite domination may impede or even block 
further democratization" (Sørensen 2008 p. 74). 
 
Moreover, Burkhart and de Soysa suggest that there is a strong positive connection between 
economic liberalization and democratization and that economical liberalization therefore is no 
enemy towards democracy. However, there are still scholars that believe that rapid economic 
liberalization, in the post-Soviet region, has rather had a negative effect on the process of 
democratization than the other way around (Fish 2005). This is because rapid economic 
reform has a negative effect on both popular rule and welfare. Rapid reforms often 
undermines representative institutions to carry the reform through, and thus democracy is 
weakened. As economic reforms are implemented from the outside, and forced upon the 
population, implementing them often hurts popular democracy in a stage of democratization, 
leading to for example authoritarian nostalgia. As shock-therapy and other rapid reforms are 
economically endured by the population (See Fish 2005, and Przeworski 1991). 
One cannot start a process of democratization before the basic needs of the community are 
met. When  people are suffering from hunger and disease, and are fighting just to stay alive, it 
is naive to think that they would achieve to consolidate a democracy. As Julius Nyerere the 
former president of Tanzania said, the struggle in Africa is freedom from poverty, hunger and 
disease (Sørensen 2008 p. 12). 
The logic of shock-therapy is that if a government has eliminated all economic freedom and 
therefore all economic life is become a part of government, there is no financial base for a real 
political opposition. And political oppositions are in fact essential if a regime is to be called a 
democracy (Fish 2005 p. 156-157). At the same time, economic liberalization and a free 
market is thought to make grounds for the emergence of other relevant social phenomenon 
like class and class structure. This is something that scholars, from Marx, Engels, Linz and 
Stepan, Dahl and Przeworski, have seen as an important feature of democratization. No 
middle class or bourgeois no democracy.  (Fish 2005 p. 157). 
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Furthermore, as an open economy lessens state control over its citizens, so too is it thought to 
lessen its control over political opposition. Because if there are funds available for a election 
campaign from the private sector; organizations, associations, and persons are less reliant of 
the state for money and other resources which lessen governmental political influence over 
the civil society. 
In sum, the logic of rapid economical change is that it though the market the political sphere 
is opened up by  allowing the formation of autonomous agents which are financially 
independent of the state and therefore can be the basis for a political opposition. So economic 
reform changes and creates political openness which strengthens the process of 
democratization, more than democratization in itself creates economic liberalization. (Fish 
2005). 
Criticism of  reforms such as shock-therapy is that they can undermine the notion of 
democracy itself, and therefore destroy the process of democratization. Przeworski presents 
four possible outcomes: "(1) Reforms may advance under democratic conditions, (2) reforms 
may be forced through by a dictatorship, (3) democracy may survive by abandoning reforms, 
and (4) both reforms and democracy may be undermined"(Przeworski 1991 p. 138). 
Moreover, what I understand all the scholars who deal with this approach to democratization 
agree upon, is that there is need for allocation of resources within a country which is going 
through a democratic transition. They would explain a democratic backlash based on the lack 
of allocation of economic power from the former power holders to new structures. to my 
understanding if there is no economic liberalization a backlash will occur based on the fact 
that the same power structure is maintained when or if all the economic resources still lay in 
the same hands as before because of a closely controlled system. Now, in this part of the 
thesis the bourgeois have been used as an example of new economic elites which allocated 
power outside of the old power structures. What I further understand is that liberalization of 
the economy and the creation of a strong middle class creates the possibility for a strong civil 
society to manifest itself because then it is not so dependent on resources from the 
government which in another system then can squeeze the mass population in to submission. 
Now, parallels between these points and to the process of democratization in Russia will be 
drawn, which again will serve as a tool to analyze the case of the Russian Backlash further on 
in the thesis. 
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2.3.4 Institutional problems, democratization and backlashes 
The constitution is one of the most consequential and influential institutions in a country. It 
creates a set of rules that need to be followed when making laws, and it prescribes rights, 
protections as well as the division of power between other institutions in politics. It also shape 
the distribution of power between citizens and the state (Fish 2005). That is why this part will 
present some theories on how different political systems can affect democratization and 
democratic recession. Further explain why political openness, competition and participation 
are connected to civil society, and how these things are connected to democratic backlashes.  
How the power is divided is based on which democratic system the constitution lays grounds 
for. One often uses three different categories: parliamentarism, semipresidentialism (mixed 
system) and precidentialism. Moreover, the qualities of the different systems and their effect 
on democratization are debated. Yet, as the Russian constitution determines Russia to be a 
semi-presidency I turn more focus to this category and how it affects democracy. 
Some scholars who advocate for parliamentarlism, like Arend Lijphart, claim that this is the 
most democratic system. Under a constitution which favors parliamentary rule, the 
government is formed by the composition of the parliament. The prime minister exercises 
executive power, however, he or she answers to the parliament. This form for government is 
often seen as highly representative which means that the parliament looks like the people, 
either in ideological, ethnic or other terms. One of the main focuses from advocates for this 
form of government is that they are skeptical to unconstrained executive power, so in 
parliamentary rule the prime minister answers to the legislature. He or she only serves as long 
as he has the majority behind him or her, and if he or she loses this the prime minister can be 
dismissed (Fish 2005 p. 194 and Lijphart 2008). 
Not unlike parliamentarism, presidentialism also has its advocates. They claim that 
presidentialism is favorable because in this system the parliament and the president are two 
independent entities. Because of the separation of power the two institutions have their own 
legitimacy and a constitutional ability to check and balance each other. However, the main 
argument used by advocates of presidency is that in time of crisis the president can be a 
powerful actor. As he or she is embodied and elected by the whole people he is an actor who 
has great legitimacy. A president is said to be more capable to act rapidly and more decisively 
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in time of need. He or she can do so because of his or hers legitimacy rise above social 
cleavages which can dominate in a parliament (Fish 2005 p. 195). 
Semipresidentialism can be seen as having features from both parliamentary and presidential 
rule. It is said to combine three elements; first, the president of the republic is elected by the 
people in an independent election, second the president possesses quite considerable powers, 
and third apart from the president there is a prime minister and other ministers, who possess 
executive and governmental power given to them by support in the parliament. For a system 
to be a semi-presidency the president needs to have some minimum authority; however, the 
parliament and the ministers also need to have real executive and governmental power, which 
again is based on support from the parliament, not other institutions. Even if the president is 
the head of state, a semipresidential system implies that  the parliament has actual  
parliamentary power and control over the government.  
This can be achieved through either appointing ministers or at least having the right to reject 
or confirm ministers individually, and through this have a real say in the composition of the 
cabinet. Furthermore, it is crucial that the parliament may terminate the government if it loses 
the support of the parliament, without the parliament needing to risk their own seats. This 
means that the rejection of a government not necessarily triggers a new parliamentary election 
because this can make the legislators hold back which, in turn,  reduces the parliament's 
power over the executive. Moreover, the parliament needs to have the right to investigate the 
president and the government, which also leaves room to monitor governmental agencies like 
the police, the military or other organs of state security (Fish 2005). 
Thus, the idea is that a semipresidential system separates power where the parliament has 
some say over the government and reduces the risk of having a too powerful president. As 
well as the president can be a decisive voice in government as he is elected directly by the 
people and not based on the parliament and its composition. (Fish 2005 p. 195). 
Moreover, the question then is: How are democratic systems connected to democratization 
and democratic backlashes? First of all, scholars claim that parliamentary systems and to 
some degree semi-presidential systems have more open politics, while presidential systems 
have less-open politics. This is connected to the fact that the parliament is the center of the 
national politics in the first two, while in a system like the American the president is the 
political centre. This again leads to less openness, and less participation from other political 
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actors and civil society. So in the case of choosing political institutions it can be claimed that 
facilitating most of the executive power in one institution can compromise democratization 
because it makes it harder for  broader participation, especially when it comes to including 
minorities and their interests in politics. Nevertheless, M. Steven Fish in his analysis of the 
three different forms of democratic government suggests that which of the three systems one 
chooses in face of a transition towards democracy does not need to be decisive for the 
process. The most important aspect is that countries with stronger parliaments have done 
better, in a process of democratization, than those with weaker parliaments (Fish 2005).  And 
as the parliament is a composed by the population it can easily be recognized as the popular 
will, which strengthens the image of democratization and democratic transitions as a tool 
against a repressive governments which is brought down by the people (Huntington 1991).
  
Moreover, this brings us to the connection between political openness, power sharing and the 
civil society. The theory also assumes that to ensure political openness and democratization 
there is need for a civil society. There needs to be a possibility for people to organize 
themselves into interest organizations or groups. To demonstrate without being persecuted for 
having opinions that may be critical towards  public policy. In other words there is need for a 
system which is open for a society that can be a force which checks and balances the political 
society so that it can prevent the system from becoming a dictatorship. Moreover, the 
assumption is that  if these things are not in place one, can be sure of a movement towards 
lesser competition and participation, and therefore se signs of a democratic backlash taking 
place (Linz & Stepan 1996,Fish 2005, Huntington 1991 and Dahl 1971). 
Furthermore, not having an open society, both in political and civil terms, will make it 
impossible to reach what was presented as the goal of a process of democratization; a 
consolidated democracy. Another word for this form of government is by Dahl called a 
Polyarchy, and if a system is not open for participation or competition it can never reach this 
goal. It can only then become what he calls a competitive oligarchy or an inclusive hegemony 
(see figure 2 in page 15). Moreover, such a system can at best become a democracy in 
accordance to the system which one can trace back to the political system of South- Africa 
during the apartheid regime. And it can only be sustained for so long before the system will 
experience a democratic backlash because it does not open for participation from other parts 
of society, as political openness is defined as having both competition and participation, but 
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also as having political and civil liberties. Not having all of these features of democracy can at 
best create what Inglehart and Welzel calls "sham" democracies, which I understand will 



























SECTION C: Methods 
3.1.1 Methods 
This master thesis is based on qualitative content analysis, combined with an hermeneutic 
approach towards the content and context, as well as a conceptual analysis based on the 
discourse between different authors and their use of the same term (See Democracy and 
Democratization). As all the data used in this paper are written sources it will consist of 
qualitative research only. However, some of the data referred to is in fact quantitative surveys 
and indexes. Like for example Freedom House's index of freedom in the world. But I will not 
discuss the problems and difficulties connected to doing surveys and statistics in social 
science, what I will do is analyze the qualitative data, with use of the theories presented in 
Section A. As well as clarifying the usage of the concept democracy, democratization and 
democratic backlash. 
The data I use is based on written sources like academic books, academic articles, an 
academic survey and newspaper articles. This means that I am writing my master thesis based 
on a review of documents and their content. Moreover, even if this is not a natural science 
study there is something or a phenomenon I am trying to shed some light on, based on 
explanations made by other scholars. The dependent variable in this study is therefore: the 
failure to democratize Russia– where as the independent variables are made up by the theories 
,which try to explain why. I will look at some of these explanations and try to review what 
kind of explanatory power these  have when I am using them on the case of Russia, or 
whether we need to use them all to understand this case of failed democratization or 
democratic backlash. 
Furthermore, in some ways this paper not be so concerned with academia's focus on positivist 
knowledge. This means that I will not try to generalize and  "isolate" my case in such a way 
as a natural scientist can do with his or hers experiments in a laboratory. As Robert Cox 
claims, the human world is complex and we can never account for all the variables (Cox 
1981). So I will rather use a more historical and hermeneutic approach to my data. This means 
using different parts, and in this case different explanations, to understand the whole case. 
Trying to understand a  part of history and the present day based on interpreting them through 
theories so that I may shed some new light on the democratization process and  the 
democratic backlash in Russia.  
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What is more, I am not trying to put the Russian regime on a scale of “how democratic” it is, 
but rather using Dahl definition to determine whether or not Russia has moved from a 
political open system to a less open system. In order to do so, I will use Dahl's definition of 
liberal democracy.  
So, as my method is mainly based on content analysis, I have used a model for doing a 
qualitative ethnographic content analysis (ETC) which I got from Social research methods by 
Alan Bryman, and a similar model or recipe from Kjeldstadli's chapter in Metodisk feltarbeid. 
These models gave me the steps which are needed  by a researcher dealing with documents as 
his or hers data. Based on a combination between the two models gave me the  following 
steps: 
1) Generate a research question 2) Become familiar with the contexts which the documents 
are or were generated in. 3) Find a small number of documents which one should get extra 
familiar with. 4) investigate and decide on the credibility of the documents and the authors. 5) 
Generate categories which will guide the collection of data, and make it more accessible. 
(Bryman 2012 and Kjeldstadli 1997) 
As for the hermeneutic approach, I have and will use what is called a critical hermeneutic 
approach in my analysis. This means that combined with the ETC I have collected data and 
theories which allow me to forge an understanding of the context as a whole based on 
different interpretations and explanations (Bryman 2012). In this case this means  theories 
dealing with democratization and democratic backlashes, and then connected them to the case 
of Russia.   
Moreover, this means that I continually  interrogate the documents and their topics when 
extracting data to create knowledge. Bryman divides this into three moments of examination: 
1) The social-historical moment, which is the moment the examination of the producer of the 
text, its intentional recipient, the context which the text are produced, transmitted and 
received in. 2) The formal moment, which is the moment when the formal analysis of the 
texts and its parts are done. 3) The interpretation- reinterpretation moment. This third part is 
the result of the other two parts; it is when a scholar puts the parts together and try to interpret 
the results. (Bryman 2012 p. 561). Furthermore, I understand these moments of examination 
as if there are several similarities between the ETC and the critical hermeneutic approach to 
qualitative data, which include the use of documents in research. 
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3.1.2 Dealing with documents 
Documents do always have a content. And this content can be used to give an answer to a 
problem, however, there is a long distance between content and facts. What I mean is that 
even if something is claimed to be the truth, a social scientist needs to be critical towards all 
the different written truths. One example to clarify this can be:  
 "The devils existence is covered by a great many sources, but the usable data which a 
scientist can get out of those documents is based on which questions the scientist is asking. 
Today those documents (the Bible, Koran etc.) could  probably not be used to determine the 
existence of Biblical figures. However it could be used to gain insight to the past's conception 
of the world" (translation of Duedahl and Jacobsen 2010 p.53). 
 This serves as an example of how one should be critical of written sources, and how they can 
be used to gain knowledge or facts. Because when writing scholarly one is supposed to be 
critical towards what one reads, and every paper is supposed to be suspected of unreliability, 
which one, by using a hermeneutic approach, decides whether or not one finds it reliable. 
(Duedahl and Jabobsen 2010). 
Furthermore, when dealing with documents as the main sources for a study it has been argued 
that documents should be examined in terms of the context they were written in and who the 
implied readers are. Because documents are written in order to argue for one impression of 
reality, and it is in favor of the authors and those whom they represent. One of the central 
points here is that documents need to seen for what they are. They are written with a purpose 
in mind, and not simply as a reflection of reality. They are written by someone who interpret 
reality, which again is interpreted by  the reader of the text. This means that there is a 
significant process of communication between a sender, a message, and a receiver. 
(Kjeldstadli 1997, Bryman 2012). 
Moreover, connected to my thesis a similar problems in dealing with documents and their 
place in reality are in  fact present with the kind of sampling that I have used.  The sample has 
a tendency to represent information which is part of the same dominating culture. Even if the 
categories which I made serve as a label of academic area for these different scholars, they all 
come from the same narrative or paradigm. What I mean is that even if they have different 
views of what the best way to ensure that the democratic transition is completed without a 
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democratic backlash is, all of the literature is part of the western world's narrative. This means 
that it is part of the tradition which see for example democracy as the only legitimate form of 
government. Moreover, as most of it comes either from  western literature during the Cold 
War, or the aftermath of it, one has to be aware that it is not value free at all (Thagaard 2006). 
This is part of what is known as confirmability which I will come back to in part 3.4.1.  
Moreover, when dealing with documents as a source of information it has been argued that 
documents should be viewed as linked to other documents because they often are a response 
to or/- and refer to other documents. These earlier documents can thus be seen as the context 
or background for the latter documents one uses in the research. In this thesis the book by 
Sørensen: Democracy and Democratization and its connection to Polyarchy by Dahl can 
serve as an example of what is tried to be explained above. This kind of connection is 
sometimes referred to as "inter-textuality". (Bryman 2012 p. 555). 
3.3.1 Interpretation as science 
As a social scientist much of our findings are in fact often based on interpretation. Even if one 
does quantitative research a scholar often needs to interpret the results. A document analysis 
or review will ultimately in the end depend on how good the quality of the documents are in 
context to the phenomenon one as a researcher is trying to explain (Duedahl and Jacobsen 
2010). Nevertheless, in this thesis the documents all are part of the same discussion which is: 
how do we understand democratization and democratic backlashes? Moreover, books and 
articles, both academic and from newspapers, are a good source of getting in to a debate about 
a certain topic. (Kjeldstadli 1997). 
Yet, it is important to be aware of the fact that when I am doing this kind of research, I am 
using an inductive method rather than a deductive one. This means that I have not formulated 
a problem statement which I am trying to falsifying, prove wrong, through for example 
statistical data or observation. I am using an inductive method where I am looking for 
confirmation of my topic. I already at the start accept that Russia has had a democratic 
backlash, and then go on finding theories which try to explain why such backlashes can occur, 
or at least what is assumed to be needed to create a consolidated democracy. Then I use these 
theories to analyze my data, not falsifying it rather verifying it. So I am trying to gain 
knowledge through experience rather than through no experience, which means that I am 
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looking for, and emphasizing, signs of a democratic backlash rather than signs of an increase 
in democracy. 
Nevertheless, some scholars would say that  this kind of research does not make it less valid 
than research done using the quantitative methods, in for example the field of natural 
sciences. In a debate in the philosophy of science some talk about experiential realism. This is 
not connected to experiments but experience. The term is connected to theories that claim that 
if we accept that there is a form of independent truth out there which is independent of us, 
then we need to use our body and mind to gain knowledge of it.  We then use our body as a 
vessel for gaining knowledge and experiences. This includes the mind, our brain and our 
senses as well. What this means is that if there in fact is an objective world out there, we need 
to go and experience it, and this can only be done by using or body and mind, regardless of 
methods. (Aase and Fossåskaret 2007 p.54.) 
In some ways we can connect this kind of thinking to David Hume and empiricism. 
Empiricism is a theory of knowledge which say that knowledge only come from our 
experiences. In this respect human knowledge is only possible to gain based on the ideas we 
make based on our experiences, cause and effect.  
Moreover, Hume is known for his theory about causality and induction. Hume is critical 
towards the concept of a causal explanation which can be free from experience or 
impressions. His example is that when a billiard ball hits another we experience a cause and 
effect. However, we can only experience that firs A rolls, that A hits B, and that B starts to 
roll. This creates an idea that A causes B to roll, and through repeated experiences we get the 
impression or expectation that every time A hits B, B will start to roll. This cannot create an 
objective law, and we cannot be sure that every time A hits B, B will start to roll. However, 
we can expect that, based on our former experiences which have given us knowledge and 
expectations. (Skirbekk and Gilje 2007) With this in mind one can maybe accept that even 
though this thesis is not based on quantitative research, one can maybe accept that it can 
create ideas, impressions and expectatios about what can cause democratization to fail or 
succeed. As this is a case study I cannot create an objective law, however if  there are several 
similar studies they together can create an expectation of what will come to be in a process of 
democratization based on certain criteria. As the world is complex these may not be the best 
explanations forever, yet it can be a good starting point. 
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This brings us to the arguments for taking a hermeneutic approach to the case and the data. 
Writers like Gadamer, Habermas and Dilthey claim that interpretation is an important feature 
in the social sciences. (Taylor 2001 p. 239). It is to some degree  relevant that a hermeneutic 
approach tries to make an object, be it a case, a text, a picture or something else, which to 
some degree is unclear understandable. With this in mind, what Charles Taylor claims is that 
for a hermeneutic process to be successful it needs to have made an interpretation which 
makes a case clearer and more understandable than it was before. And what makes it correct? 
Well the answer Taylor comes up with is that what was seen as incomprehensible now is 
understandable (Taylor 2001). 
Furthermore, a thesis like this one, based on a content analysis, need to take the form of a 
discussion, this is because the reader becomes part of the discussion. He or she will be 
convinced or remain unconvinced on basis of the arguments written in the text. This is why 
when working with this kind of data (texts) I try to make the reader see the thesis  as a whole 
at the same time as I refer him or her back to the different parts. In this respect they become 
part of my hermeneutic approach: first starting with a presentation of the case, then taking 
them through the different parts, which becomes the whole text. Where hopefully they get a 
better understanding of the whole case after reading all the parts. The idea is using the parts to 
analyze and understand the overall case, which is the essence of the hermeneutic circle 
(Taylor 2001).  
3.4.1 Trustworthiness and authenticity 
Some scholars have suggested that qualitative studies should be judged by other criteria than 
quantitative studies. Rather than evaluating it on their relation to reliability and validity they 
should be judged on the trustworthiness and authenticity of the sources based on four criteria: 
credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Bryman 2012). 
Credibility has to do with whether or not  the conclusion the researcher has arrived at is 
credible.  This is done by establishing credible findings which is carried out through the 
proper practice. Furthermore, the credibility can be investigated by for example using a 
technique called triangulation. Triangulation means using more than one method or source of 
data in the study of a social phenomena, it can be by using several observers, theoretical 
perspectives, sources of data and methodologies (Bryman 2012). I will return to this issue in 
the next part of this chapter. 
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Transferability is connected to the context in which the research is done. It is based on giving 
rich accounts and details of the context where the research is done, so that others can refer to 
it as a database for judging the possibility for transferring of findings to another case or 
context. This is especially important to qualitative studies because they are often carried out 
on small groups or individuals (Bryman 2012). So, to deal with this I try to give as much 
background information about the case as I find relevant, and I try to use numerous examples 
when dealing with the data I have collected. 
Dependability has bears similarity to reliability. It consists of keeping a complete record of all 
the research, all the data and all the sources of information which a researcher has used,  in 
such a manner that others can review it. Moreover, so that peers then can act as auditors who 
can both review the content and check if the proper procedures have been followed. (Bryman 
2012). In this thesis this means that I keep a record of all the written sources which I use and 
refer to as either theory or data. 
Confirmability has to do with ensuring that one is aware that complete objectivity is 
impossible when doing social research, so the researcher has to show that he or she has acted 
in what Bryman calls good faith. This means not allowing personal values to manifest and 
affect the findings of a research (Bryman 2012). 
3.4.1 Authenticity and Credibility  
According to Duedahl and Jacobsen the documents one wants to use to solve a problem have 
to be considered based on four criteria: their authenticity, credibility, representativeness and 
their connection to the problem statement which one is trying to solve. This bears similarity to 
what Bryman claims to be the case as I presented in the part above about trustworthiness. 
How I chose to deal with these terms will now be reflected upon  (Duedahl and Jacobsen 2010 
p. 55 and Bryman 2012). 
Authenticity means that the document is in fact what it claims to be. That it is not manipulated 
or falsified. Credibility is a criteria one needs to consider as well. To find out if a source of 
information is authentic and credible one can look for sign of quality. For example when 
reading academic texts one can see what publishing company is used and which research 
institution the author comes from. Is it a renowned institution like Harvard, Cambridge etc? 
And also if other scholars have referred to it, used it in their own work, or if the author of a 
document is a well known one. The same goes for the document itself. 
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Furthermore, as a scholar using written data it is important to be aware that texts are not 
produced without an agenda. For example newspaper articles are written by journalists, which 
means that they are often ordered, and reviewed by an editorial line. It is for example not 
unusual in Norway to divide newspapers according to traditional and historical political 
sympathies. And as I use Norwegian articles as data in my analysis I need to be aware that 
they are not value free, as part of a liberal democratic tradition, as well as historically being 
part of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the direct opponent to the Soviet 
Union and Russia. This means that I as a student from Norway can live in what Kuhn calls a 
paradigm, a different view of the world, than what a student from for example Russia may 
have. (Duedahl and Jacobsen 2010). This can both be connected to what Taylor says about 
texts, and Brymans terms confirmability and credibility.  
Moreover, it could be important to understand why I have chosen to attack this topic in the 
way I have. As mentioned I am a Norwegian student which means that Norwegian is my first 
language. I do not speak Russian which prevents me from reading Russian newspaper articles 
or books. With the resources I have available this meant that I had to continue only using data 
from western academic and non-academic works.  
Furthermore, because the thesis is based on interpretation it can be good to find several 
sources which claim the same, yet without basing it on the exact same sources. This is part of 
how one can triangulate data. However, as a student at the master level this can be hard to do 
because of the limited time and resources available.  It takes a lot of time to find, read and 
review all the different documents, and therefore I have found some main sources which 
debate democratization and democratic backlashes directly and indirectly, with focus on 
different explanations. 
Moreover, in some ways I would call my collection of data similar to snowball sampling. 
With this I mean that I chose the different books and articles based on references from 
different authors. As an example when I used the University library at the University of 
Tromsø and searched for books on democratization I found the book Democracy and 
Democratization written by Sørensen. He referred me  to Huntington and Dahl and so on. 
Moreover, as these two authors are well known in the academic circles, and therefore I feel 
that these are credible and trustworthy sources. This means that I in other books I was 
critically looking for references to the same renown authors to identify their credibility.  
40 
 
As well as this, I triangulated books that referred to other well known data sets, like Freedom 
House's survey Freedom in the World, where they measure political freedom, openness and 
civil and political liberties. As well as looking for references to the Polity datasets which are a 
statistical base connected to war between countries. Doing this helped me in determining both 
the credibility of books, but also the credibility of the data given from Freedom House.   
However, as I said before,  my choice of credible books was also based on which publishing 
company and where the scholars had worked (For example Yale, Cambridge etc.). Moreover, 
I also looked for authors that where referred to and debated in books that were not their own. 
Like in M. Steven Fish's book he debates economic liberalization based on the debate 
between scholars in favor for rapid change and people against it: Burkhart and De Soysa vs. 
Przeworski and also Cohen. This debate referred me to their books so that I could look it up 
and decide for myself if I agree with Fish's interpretation. This is important when doing 
academic research in the social sciences so that it is possible for others to go to the same 
sources and reach the same conclusions, which is connected to what Bryman calls 
dependability. This is why it can be important to consult the primary source rather than the 
secondary source. In my case this meant for example reading Huntington and Dahl instead of 
taking for granted that what Sørensen claimed was true. 
All these different authors I have referred to and used in my research have different 
perspectives on democratization, and the criteria needed to consolidate a process towards 
democracy. Which I in turn interpret and use as features to look for when determining if there 
has been a movement towards greater or lesser democracy, hence a democratic backlash. This  
is why I have divided them into three explanatory categories like it was advised by the 
different methods connected to doing qualitative research.  These categories have also been 
divided in too the different parts of my theory chapter: Political culture and democratic 
backlashes, democratization, economic development and the possibility for a backlash and  
Institutional Problems, democratization and backlashes. 
So, in some ways one can maybe claim that I have used books as my informants like other 
students use interviewees as their informants when it comes to snowball sampling. To some 
degree I have the same procedure for choosing my sources of information. What I am trying 
to say is that I first found a few sources with the features or qualities which I wanted to use. 
Thereafter these informants gave me the names of other documents with the same type of 
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qualities and content. And in some ways this can work as a triangulation which creates even 
more credible information. 
Nevertheless, this method poses a certain problem which I to some degree have and will 
discuss connected to this approach to the data. In fact this can create a sample of information 
which is part of the same side of the discussion, or part of the same network. To counteract 
this I tried to find authors who had different views and opinions on what best works to avoid 
democratic backlashes, and therefore I assumed them to be part of another network of 
scholars, or at least not so intertwined. This is to try and keep some kind of confirmability, so 
that I can claim to have been at least as objective as it was possible when doing research like 
this. And it also made my MA more in line with what Bryman calls Transferability giving rich 
details of the context with several references for the readers to look up. So, the analogy in 
using the snowball method is that one starts with a small sample of informants, which 
gradually expand like a snowball will when it rolls. (Thagaard 2006 p.54) 
 
3.1.5 Representativeness  
When doing a document analysis it is important to critically review if the sources are in fact 
able to represent what one are trying to answer. Sometimes when doing a qualitative analysis 
one can experience that  a source that was regarded as a good source of information some 
years ago may not be considered to be one today. For example when doing a document 
analysis it is important to find out if the terms used were used in the same way before as they 
are today. In other words a term or a concept may not contain the same meanings today as it 
did before. (Duedahl and Jacobsen 2010). One of the main terms or concepts which I use in 
this thesis is the concept of democracy, and it is clear that it needed to be clarified what I 
mean when I use the term in this thesis. What I also found through a small content analysis of 
the term democracy is that  the same term can have many meanings and take many forms. In 
other words, it became clear that one cannot take for granted that they mean the same as me. 
As presented in the SECTION B of this thesis the term democracy is not value free, as a term 
never can. Some scholars regard voting as the most important part of democracy, like from 
the ancient Greek, whereas others claim that there is more to the term. What also became 
clear is that some scholars now talk about "sham" democracies, which means that some 
regimes hide under the name of democracy, despite having only some characteristics of what 
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is meant when talking about liberal democracy, which is seen as the most legitimate form of 
democracy today.  
Furthermore, I tried to show that when doing a content analysis the goal is to understand the 
content of a text which one wants to use as a tool for their analysis, or as data in it. Because 
texts are part of the human sphere it is always through language and interpretation that we get 
knowledge about these. Yet, this means that there will always be room for error as well 
because a document contains at least three different meanings: The writers meaning, the text 
itself, and the readers interpretation. Nevertheless, even if the texts never are value free they 
can represent an understanding of reality which can serve as valuable insight. But therefore it 
is also important to be clear when it comes to what one means when using terms, like for 
example democracy.  (Duedahl and Jacobsen 2010). 
Moreover, as presented earlier in this thesis the theories which I use are not directly focused 
on democratic backlashes, but rather on what needed to have a successful democratization 
process. For me this meant that I had to reverse this thinking from looking for features of 
success to the lack of these features. This means that I have to be aware that the theories 
which I use are not necessarily meant for the purpose which I use them for. 
Something also has to be said about the main sources of data which I use in this thesis. I 
mainly use three different academic sources of data, as well as one non academic source. The 
first academic one is the Freedom House index: Freedom in the World which is a tool that can 
give insight in to the democratic trends in the world, in accordance to Dahl's notion of 
democracy. As well as using this index from Freedom House, I also use their country report 
which deals with the democratic trends within a specific country, in this case Russia. I found 
this a credible source as it does research based on the democratic criteria similar to Dahl, and 
it is as well being referred to by several of the scholars which I use in the theory chapter. 
The second main source is Hønneland and Jørgensen's book Moderne Russisk Politik which 
gives a rich account of both the political history of Russia, and  of how the Russian 
institutions are organized and how power is divided between the different governmental 
institutions. The book is published by a company publishing several scholarly books which I 
therefore found the book credible. As well as the authors are scholars from the Norwegian 
Fridtjof Nansens Institutt which helped me in this respect. 
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The third main source of data I use is M. Steven Fish and his book Democracy Derailed in 
Russia which give insight on both economical data on Russia, as well as data on the situation 
of the civil society in Russia. I judged this source according to similar criteria as the second 
source, as the book is published by Cambridge University Press, and as Fish has been among 
other things an associate professor at Berkeley. 
Nevertheless, as these three main sources are all academic books I also use several news 
paper articles which cover recent events in Russia. Nevertheless, these are not scientific 
articles and cannot be judged as trustworthy and credible in the same way as the academic 
books. However, as two of the elections which I focus on in this thesis have just been 
completed (December 2011 and March 2012) it has been difficult to find scholarly articles 
which cover this topic. As scholarly articles are products of a much longer process of editing 
and judgment. This is why I have used several articles from Aftenposten which I find to be the 
best Norwegian newspaper when it comes to foreign affairs.  
Furthermore, for my thesis this will mean that what some of the newspaper articles and data 
collected not necessarily represent the present day in Russia. However, because they reflect 
the same reality as what I have found in the rest of my sources I consider them to be 
representative too. Thus the sources I then refer to as my main sources are ; the academic 














SECTION D: Empirical data and analysis. 
Just to remind the reader, what I will try to answer with the use of the theories presented 
above are the following questions: When scholars around the world now talk about the 
Russian democratization process , they talk about a "Russian Backlash".  - 1) What is meant 
by this? 2) What are the main explanations of the phenomenon? 3) And how do these 
explanations together contribute to our understanding of the Russian case?  
To answer these questions I will use some of the concepts and the theories which were 
presented in the theory chapter. I will start by arguing what is meant by a Russian backlash 
based on the concept of democratization. 
To answer the most important questions: "What are the main explanations " and "How do the 
explanations together contribute to our understanding of the Russian case" I will discuss the 
data in light of the  different theories on democratization and democratic backlashes.  
I will start by analyzing the democratic backlash in light of the economic theory with a special 
focus on whether the economic reforms created a middle class system in Russia, which are 
seen by the theory as an important condition for a country trying to become more democratic. 
And then I will discuss how one can explain the democratic backlash if this condition is not in 
place.Then I will go on to analyze how institutional problems, restrictions of political and 
civil liberties connected to electoral fraud and state control over media coverage can 
contribute to our understanding of the Russian backlash. After that I will move on to discuss 
how the political development, examined through the lens of what I have called political 
culture,  can explain the democratic recession in Russia during the 1990s and 2000s. 
Together with data and theory, I will try to reflect on what I have found through this process 
of writing this thesis. As Dahl's definition of democracy has been important up to this point in 
this thesis, I will also base the analysis on it.  Therefore I also find that it could be fruitful to 
shortly look on whether the Russian system, today,  fits in to this definition, or not. Moreover, 
the last part of SECTION C will reflect upon the different theories and their explanatory 
power, and with the intention of answering the last question, how they together can contribute 
to an wider understanding of the whole case through a more hermeneutic or holistic approach. 
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4.1.1 An introduction to Russia’s political development  
During the 1990’s it became common to categorize and grade regimes according to the levels 
of democracy. This was used to compare cases of democratization (Pridham 2001). On most 
surveys used by scholars doing research on democracy and democratization, the starting point 
of the research is often “how democratic, or what degree of democracy one can find” or “how 
authoritarian” a regime is. One of these surveys is the Freedom House Index which rates 
countries based on similar criteria as Dahl. This survey is a tool to look at the shifts and trends 
in Russia and its democracy. 
Moreover, as presented by the Freedom House Index: Freedom in the World, something 
changed in Russia after the reign of Boris Yeltsin ended and the new reign of Vladimir Putin 
began. Several scholars now talk about a "Russian Backlash", and Freedom House has 
degraded the Russian regime from "Partly free" to "Not Free", based on the trends from 2004- 
2007.  
According to the Freedom House Index, a partly free country is one in which there is a limited 
respect for  basic political rights and civil liberties. A partly free country can operate within a 
political climate where there it is corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic and religious conflicts , 
and all this in a political environment where a single party dominates political life even if 
there is a certain degree of pluralism. A not free country is one where basic political rights are 
absent, and basic civil liberties are systematically denied (Freedom House Index: Freedom in 
the world p.6). As mentioned in the theory chapter, there are seven points which are meant to 
estimate and describe or characterize changes in regimes. These points are based on 29 
questions posed to the participants whom takes part in the research, which cover the topics:  
1) electoral processes, 2) political pluralism and participation, 3) functioning government.  
And as for the civil liberties: 4) freedom of expression and belief, 5) associational and 
organizational rights, 6) rule of law, and 7) personal autonomy (Freedom House Index's 
checklist questions). How Russia, and the regime there, scores worse today on these 
indicators will be elaborated later during the next parts of the thesis. 
Moreover, as presented in the theory chapter, a country can be said to be undergoing a process 
of democratization when there is an increase in competition and/or participation. As presented 
by Dahl's figure one can say that there is a process of democratization when there is 
movement towards a "polyarchy". To some extent one can claim that there was movement 
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towards greater democracy in Russia after the end of the Soviet Union. During the 1990's 
Russia underwent systematic changes, liberal changes which gave room for pluralism and 
participation and an electoral process with regular elections. Yet, during the late 1990's these 
changes were reversed. Now, it is hard to claim that Russia is less open today than during the 
Cold War. However, what is meant by a Russian Backlash is a regression when it comes to 
the democratic process in Russia. From an increase in competition and participation in 
politics, the Russian regime has become a system where basic political rights and civil 
liberties have been systematically denied during the last decade, as presented by Freedom 
House.  
Nevertheless, this brings us to the next part of this thesis. With the use of the theories 
presented earlier I will now attempt to explain why such a backlash has occurred. To this end , 
I will use the theories on the data which I have collected through books and articles. And then 
see how they can help me understand how and why this has resulted in the Russian regime 
being degraded from "Partly Free" to "Not Free" on the Freedom House Index's scale. 
4.1.2 The Soviet Heritage  
The Soviet Union was to some degree a totalitarian state and today we can talk about a more 
open Russia than at that time in history. It could be said that the difference between today’s 
system in Russia and the one in the Soviet Union is that nowadays there are multiple actors 
that create the country’s policy, as well as several parties, greater respect for the rule of law, 
and more liberty for the citizens. The Soviet regime was less open because most of the policy 
and power was centered at the position as general secretary and leader of the communist 
party.  Paradoxically the Soviet system had some characteristics we associate with a 
democratic system; they had elections and representative bodies. However, these elections 
were not free in the sense we think of elections as free in the western democracies. People had 
to vote by law, and they could only vote for one candidate. And it is said that the elected 
bodies did little else than formally approve of decisions that were already made in the 
communist party. The real power was in the party itself, and most power was vested in one 
position, which has gone by many names, and which in these days goes by the title of 
president (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006).  
In the introduction it is mentioned that after the end of the Cold War the world could see a 
new “wave” of democratization, especially in the former parts of the Soviet Union or behind 
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the “Iron Curtain” as a part of the Warsaw-Pact. Among these were Russia, the biggest and 
most central country in the Soviet Union and the communist bloc.  With the collapse of the 
Soviet Union the Russian Federation emerged as a separate state. Under its new leader and 
president, Boris Yeltsin, Russia tried to go “westwards”  which consisted in trying to make 
the political system more democratic and changing the economy towards a liberal market. In 
other words, it actually involved going from one political- and economical- system to a 
radically different one,  namely from a communistic form of government and a planned 
economy towards a democratic government based on a liberal market. Yeltsin and his 
advisers tried to  implement these changes through the use of shock therapy on the economic 
and political realm.  
Nevertheless, even if the change of policy gave hope and promise for democracy to Russians, 
with help from western advisers, Russia experienced an economic crisis in the late 1990s. 
With the collapse of the ruble in August 1998, Russians yearned from grater governmental 
spending and state control. One year later Yeltsin appointed Vladimir Putin as the country's 
new prime minister as his term was about to expire in 2000, and as, in line with the 
constitution of 1993, he himself was not eligible to run for president for the third time after 
serving two executive periods as president. As  predicted by many, Putin became president in 
Russia after Yeltsin's period expired. (Ambrosio 2009, Freedom House: Country Report 
2012).  
4.2.1 The backlash seen in light of the economical development in Russia. 
After the end of the Cold War  Russia went through a systemic transition from a communist 
government towards a democratic form of government based on a free market. President 
Yeltsin, along with his advisers, tried to do this through what has come to be known as 
"shock-therapy".  As presented in the part of the theory chapter dealing with democratization 
and economic development, there were several assumptions concerning what would happen if 
there was an economic transition towards a more liberal economy. 
Based on the theory I would expect to find several features during the era of democratization: 
an increase in private production which creates an independent centre of power vis-à-vis the 
political power, and a rise and expansion of a strong middle class which will demand to be 
heard through organizing themselves. In a way politics would be affected by a consumer 
model, and therefore I argue that one should find signs of a strong civil society in Russia if the 
48 
 
democratization process was proceeding successfully. Moreover, as the economic theory 
focuses on the allocation of resources away from governmental control, I argued in the theory 
chapter that a lack of allocation will result in signs of a democratic backlash. 
During the communist era the private sector was minimal or almost inexistent. Almost all 
commerce was controlled by the state. There was no room for a financial base of opposition 
because all resources were controlled by the government. And the thinking was that with the 
use of shock-therapy and economic liberalization private production and a middle class would 
emerge in Russia (Fish 2005 p. 156). 
Furthermore, the thought is that having a political opposition is an important feature, if not 
essential, for democracy itself. The idea that the shock therapists shared, was that in a country 
like Russia, that is with a long history of economic statism, a rapid liberalization would open 
doors for pluralism. Furthermore, this pluralism would create a class structure which would 
make room for  a middle-class in Russia.  This would ensure competition for political power 
and participation from the mass population. 
However, even if people talk about Russia carrying out shock therapy, M. Steven Fish claims 
that it did not do so: " First, Russia did not carry out shock therapy. Its economic reforms 
have been a hodgepodge of half measures and schemes that have little to do with shock 
therapy. Second, rapid economic liberalization is not bad for democracy" (Fish 2005 p. 158). 
Moreover, I will try to show why Fish claims it to be so. What Fish says is that already in the 
Gorbachev era there were reforms which were meant to liberalize the Russian economy to a 
certain degree. First, there was a relaxation on the ban on private enterprise which opened the 
economy for small-scale private businesses. Second there was a law which took away the ban 
on foreign investment in Russia. These two together made it possible to start up private 
production. While the third and maybe most important reform was the implementing of a law 
dealing with state enterprises. This law opened for these state enterprises to be self-managed. 
It was designed to get these major businesses to act and operate like others do in a market 
economy. Yet, the problem with these new laws, as highlighted by Fish, is that the managers 
were told to act like capitalists without having the possibility to actually be capitalists. This is 
because there were no profit motive as market prices still were controlled, and the right to hire 
or dismiss employees was not present in the communist system. There was no consumer 
model. (Fish 2005 p. 161). 
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This ambivalence and the collapse of the Soviet Union caused Yeltsin to  inherit an economy 
in ruins. People lacked basic goods and services as the distribution of these had evaporated 
with the collapse of the Soviet system. The inflation rose to 160 percent, something had to be 
done and the answer was shock therapy. As economic reform, or shock therapy, meant; free 
markets, the end of the Soviet consumer and welfare subsidies, privatization of Russian state 
enterprises, and a minimal role of government (Cohen 2000). This was going to reduce the 
size of the government budget deficit, by clearing out the obstacles for private business 
activity. The shock therapists wanted to undertake a deregulation which was to open for 
private producers and sellers to operate freely in Russia. As well as this deregulation meant 
carrying out a large scale privatization of state owned enterprises. All this was to stimulate the 
economy for rapid growth and the creation of a middle class system which would make it 
impossible to go back to communism and authoritarianism. Nevertheless, it is worth 
mentioning that a major part of the political elites supported the gradualist approach when it 
came to the liberalization of the economy and the political system (Fish 2005). 
In January 1992 the government in Russia opened the free market economy. Moreover, 
through a lens of the theory connected to democratization and its connection to economic 
development, this liberalization was supposed to create a complex society which made it more 
difficult for an authoritarian control. What the shock therapists tried to do was to lay the 
foundations for economic growth in the private sector which in turn ensured that power  was 
separated from the state apparatus. This meant that production was to be moved to the public 
as the state was to facilitate the possibility for production rather than the production itself. 
This meant allocation of resources, in order to ensure a  movement towards a western 
democracy. And at this time I would argue that there was a movement towards greater 
democracy. 
However, the old elites from the communist era still had political power, and the directors of 
the major enterprises had strong support in the opposition. And even if the plan of the shock 
therapists was to create a liberal market, Yeltsin's government reversed several aspects of the 
liberalization already at the beginning of the shock therapy by for example freezing prices on 
oil and gas. As unemployment rose in Russia during this period pressure from the powerful 
opposition became strong, so strong that Yeltsin in the end of 1992 no longer supported the 
shock therapists.  This meant that the shock therapy in Russia ended within less than a year.  
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Furthermore, the major deregulation of the state enterprises and the large-scale start up of 
small businesses never happened as intended. Cohen claims that what really happened was 
that the whole political struggle in Russia between 1992 and 1998 was between different 
actors trying to get control over the state's assets. It was not about democracy and market 
reforms. (Cohen 2000 p.17)  The actors of this struggle were the supporters of the old regime 
and the actors who can be identified as the new government. It is also said that during 
Yeltsin's period as president Russia had the most arbitrary regulation in the world which 
resulted in bribes becoming an institutionalized or normal part of doing business in Russia 
(Fish 2005 p. 164-165).  
Furthermore, large-scale privatization took place, however, not the type which was intended 
by the liberals in power at the start of the Yeltsin era. What happened was that the sitting 
management in the different major enterprises ended up acquiring the formal ownership of  
the enterprises which they managed during the end of the communist era. Actually two thirds 
of the privatized enterprises became the property of their sitting managers. Moreover, what 
was private, half private and public became unclear (Fish 2005 p. 167). So what Yeltsin's 
shock therapy brought with it was corruption and a power structure which was similar to the 
old one. The economic elites stayed and became even more powerful. Yes, one could say that  
moving ownership away from state meant allocating resources away from the political 
government. However, it did not create a model where the producers were in need of 
consumers who would buy their product. 
 No matter how long a road Russia had to be reformed and be in a transition from communism to free 
 market capitalism and democracy. And practitioners of this theory had little use for taking into account 
 Russia's history, culture and popular attitudes (In the mass population). Because the idea was that 
 Russia should forget and destroy the old way of doing politics in Russia. Destroying the old political 
 structure. But did the so called economic shock treatment work out this way? No. (Cohen 2000 p.36). 
What happened in Yeltsin's period as president was that the managers who got the formal 
ownership over the major enterprises became an independent power entity. They became so 
wealthy that they are now known as oligarchs.  
During Yeltsin's period some of them founded his political campaign in 1996 which in reality 
made him "theirs". So the oligarchs got huge political power in Russia, and had a say in 
nearly every aspect of the political life. In this period when the oligarchs had a major 
influence in the political life one could maybe argue that the private sector became powerful, 
and therefore a centre for power outside the political society like predicted and wanted by the 
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shock therapists. Yet, the distinction between the public and the private sphere became 
unclear. The fact that the oligarchs often had been directors of their enterprises did not help in 
this respect. Moreover, the fact that they got more to say in national politics than political 
institutions I would argue weakened the Russian democracy rather than strengthened it. 
This period in the history of Russia is by some seen as a economic and political chaos, and 
this is what is still being used as rhetoric by Putin's supporters. When Putin became president 
of Russia he in centralized both economic and political power. He seized strategic resources, 
both economic and political ones. One of the strategic resources which has attracted the 
attention of the Russian regime's critics is that the Kremlin in reality has full control over the 
state's media.  
Moreover, it has to be said that Putin did not seize control over the independent media either 
by force or because of a popular demand. Rather, he did it because no one could stand up to 
him. He had weakened or neutralized the other powerbases mainly represented by the 
economically powerful oligarchs (Freedom House: Country Report 2012). 
After the ended shock therapy and the end of the liberal project it is possible to identify that in 
today's Russia Putin and his new reforms have put restraints on private meddling in official 
affairs. He did so when he centralized both the economical and political power in Russia after 
Yeltsin stepped down and the Ruble collapsed in 1998. What is important is that during this 
period, as Cohen highlights, Russia was dominated by a fight between different actors for 
economic and political power, rather than concerned with creating a political system based on 
political and economical competition. Thus, the private sector has not become the 
independent power structure as predicted. 
Furthermore, the economical shock therapy never created a political competition like the 
economic theory predicted.  Maybe because the economical reforms were stopped within a 
year, we will probably never know. What is important is that  the middle class never gained a 
foothold and became an important entity or actor, so that there was no strong civil society to 
balance the political power when Putin became the president of Russia. And no one could 
therefore stand up against the centralization of strategic resources in the country after 1998. 
"Democratization in the post communist region, including Russia, has been derailed behind 
closed doors, not in the streets"( Fish 2005 page. 187). 
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Moreover, based on the economic theory, I expected to find several features which would 
ensure the process of democratization in Russia during and after the liberalization of the 
Russian market. These were composed by  an increase in private production, which would 
create an independent centre of power vis-à-vis the political power, and a rise and expansion 
of a strong middle class which will demand to be heard. However, because of the ambivalence 
and the internal power struggle during the period of economic liberalization this never 
happened in Russia. Instead the Russian society rather underwent had a democratic recession 
as the political society centralized power and increased governmental control. This restricted 
the possibility to compete and participate in the political arena and the possibility for personal 
autonomy, and are presented by the demotion from "Partly free" to "Not free" by the Freedom 
House Index. 
Nevertheless, during the 1990s it became possible to identify an aspiring middle class in the 
Russian society. Compared to other countries it is still small, yet increasing, and scientists 
claim that when it grows it will bring about bigger democratic changes. I is important to 
remember that the middle class such as one think of it in the western democracies, did not 
come over night but developed through decades. (Aale 2011). 
Yet, even if one today can identify a growing middle class in Russia the civil society has not 
become a force outside of the political society. It is mainly facilitated in the bigger cities in 
Russia; it has not spread throughout the vast country (Tjønn 2011). In Russia the civil society 
does not represent a big part of the balancing force towards the government. In light of the 
economic development it could be argued that this lack of a civil society as a force could be 
because of the economical ambivalence which one have been witnessing during the 90's and 
onwards.  Even if we can talk about the rise of a civil society  in the 1990s and onwards to the 
beginning of this millennium, because of the arbitrary economical reforms in Russia civil 
society never became a platform for political power like the way one connect it to be in the 
rest of Europe  (Fish 2005, Freedom House: Country report 2012). What I am  trying to say is 
that if the economic strategy was to create a middle class and a economical power outside the 
political elites this never happened. When one use the theory of economical development and 
democratization as a lens analyze the Russian case it becomes clear that the middle class in 
Russia has not become like the bourgeois, because of the lack of allocation of resources. As 
the shock therapist's goal was to create a structure to check and balance the government, this 
has not been realized in today's Russia. The mass population is still dependent on the states 
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resources and cannot stand on its own feet, as the government rather has tightened control 
over strategic resources, which has resulted in a recession from more liberalization and 
competition during the first part of the Yeltsin era. 
Nevertheless, interestingly enough, if one looks at the Russian economic system during the 
time of the shock therapy and onwards it could be possible to claim that today's Russia is in 
fact economically more open than it was during the Soviet era. The Russian system is open 
for foreign investment and private production, yet with strong government control and as long 
as these entities do not meddle in official affairs. Nevertheless, Burkhart and de Soysa argues 
that this kind of investment has more effect on democracy than the other way around. So 
based on this it could maybe be plausible that even if the government has tightened the grip 
and it is possible to argue for a democratic backlash in Russia, the fact that they left this small 
part of economical liberalization be open, there is hope for a rise of democracy once again. So 
even if the cup could be said not to be half full, neither is it empty?  
 
4.3.1 Democratization, institutions and a backlash  
The starting point or basis for this part of the chapter will be the political system’s 
organization in accordance to the constitution of 1993, which declares Russia as a democratic 
state with a republican form of government, based on law and with a divide between the 
executive, the legislative and judicial powers. 
Democracies can be parliamentary systems, semi-presidencies or presidencies. According to 
the Russian constitution of 1993, the country has a republican form of semi-presidency (Fish 
2005 p. 203). This implies that the executive power is independent of the legislative power. 
Consistent with the theory dealing with institutional problems and democratization, one 
would expect that in accordance with the Russian constitution the country has a strong 
parliament even though  the president is the head of state. Moreover, one can expect that there 
is a electoral cycle based on free and fair elections in accordance to Dahl's definition of 
democracy,  as well as the possibility for the mass population to organize themselves and use 
a civil society as a "mouthpiece"  to promote their interests and expectations.  Nevertheless, in 
the case of a lack of these features one would expect that the democratization process would 
stop and in the end signs of a backlash would occur. 
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4.3.2 From Yeltsin to Putin, changes in policy. 
During the Yeltsin period in Russian history I would argue that the country had a 
development towards more competition and participation. This means that according to the 
definition used in this thesis there was in fact a process of  democratization. Using the 
definition of democratization and the figure from Dahl I argue that the Russian regime was 
moving from a closed hegemony towards democracy. There were for example several parties 
which could run in the elections; in fact, there were 43 parties which competed in the 
parliament elections of 1995. During this period it was also possible to  participate in 
organizations which dealt with issues related to environment, democracy and religion. Most 
importantly, perhaps, there was to some degree  an independent media. All these changes can 
be seen as signs of  the regime's movement towards both participation and liberalization 
(public contestation).  In any case the non-democratic regime during the Soviet era was done 
with, and Russia now embarked upon a journey of democratization. Based on the data from 
Freedom House one can identify both an increase in participation and competition during this 
period. 
Nevertheless, things changed rapidly.  Note that Yeltsin during the elections in 1996 had open 
support from the biggest and most influential media and business elites. One could maybe 
think that during this governmental period the process of democratization was on its way 
towards a consolidated democracy. Moreover, this brings us to the fact that during the 
economic shock treatment huge amounts of Russia's natural resources fell in to private hands. 
Some of the economic aspects and how they influenced the democratization process in Russia 
has already been discussed. However, how they affected the political system and regime is an 
important part of this section as well. 
The  liberalization of the Russian markets gave room for some to maneuver and get their 
hands on not only natural resources like oil and gas, but also for example ownership of what 
had formerly been the state media. These people were a small group of people who often had 
high positions in the communist system during the transition from the old regime to the new. 
These people are today often referred to as oligarchs because they got huge economic 
resources which also gave them access to influence governmental politics. It is said that they 
had the President in their pocket after their support during the elections of 1996.  This was 
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further connected to why the Yeltsin regime was seen as one of the most corrupt periods of 
the great country's history (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006). 
For western observers Yeltsin's period was characterized by a great deal of ambivalence. He 
used mutually exclusive rhetoric and reforms at the same time. Rhetoric like: towards 
democracy, international integration, and a functioning market. At the same time he used anti-
western rhetoric, arbitrary policies, as well as informal ties of power and corruption. 
Moreover, it is said that during this era regional governments got to rule almost self-
determent, in a time where Russia maybe needed consolidation and a firm leadership to 
ensure the transition they embarked upon. Moreover, the way Yeltsin gave privileged roles to 
his nearest friends and allies instead of institutionalizing democratic traditions and procedures  
created a corrupt regime. And most importantly the oligarch's entry to the politics after the 
presidential elections in 1996 erased all separation between public and political society, as 
well as between the state and the economy, and gave the economically most powerful people 
a direct influence over public policy. (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006 p. 35-36). 
Nevertheless, this was about to change when Putin became the president of Russia. He had a 
vision which included more governmental spending and state control as the major population 
lived in hardship. One of Putin's reforms was actually directed towards corruption and the 
oligarchs' influence on state policy. This was welcomed by many. However, even though the 
intentions may have been good, this also made way for Russia's democratic backlash as the 
regime became less open for political difference and opposition.  
As Putin came to power in Russia he moved quickly to reduce governmental influence from 
institutions other than the presidency by applying a rhetoric against corruption. He altered the 
composition in the ministries, from one that was composed of the traditional elites, to a 
ministry composed of personnel from the security and military sector. He centralized power 
by implementing new laws under which the president from now on could handpick the 
regional governors. It is said that this was done not only ensured that the regional 
governments ruled in line with the policy from the highest authority, but also so that the 
president could have a say in the composition of the upper chamber in the state Duma, as half 
of the members are appointed by the regional governors. This was part of a policy or reform 
which was intended to make the government more efficient and to give it a vertical power 
structure, something that it lacked during the Yeltsin era. The changes in election laws were 
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said to be part of a reform that was to make the composition of the parliament more efficient 
and loyal to the presidency. (Freedom House: Country Report 2012,  Hønneland and 
Jørgensen 2006). 
Furthermore, this did not make the mass population react negatively as they came from a 
corrupt regime which made them live in hardship. Overall, Putin gained personal popularity 
as the standard of living increased for most of the Russian population. This was connected to 
the increased state control over economic sectors, and other sectors which were strategically 
important for the government. It is said that most of the improvements were driven by the 
boom in oil and gas prices which followed after the economic collapse in 1998. (Freedom 
House: Country Report 2012, Dragnes 2012). However, Putin became the face which for 
Russian was associated with stability and growth. Between 2002 and 2009 Russians' real 
wages increased with 141 percent (Dragnes 2012). 
At the same time Putin tried to eradicate the governmental corruption and corrupt structures 
which developed under Yeltsin's regime. One of the first things Putin changed was the 
influence which the oligarchs had over governmental policy. This was, as he claimed, a part 
of the fight against corruption, and also a sign of increased governmental control. As 
mentioned earlier Yeltsin was said to be in the "back pockets" of the oligarchs, something that 
Putin never would be. He summoned the most powerful elites and told them that things would 
change. From now on the oligarchs would not have political influence. In exchange Putin 
would not investigate, and if found illegal prosecute, them and the ways they got their hands 
on their wealth during the controversial privatization during the 1990's. They would from now 
on be treated  like any other economic entity, and were naturally expected to pay taxes and 
follow the laws like everyone else (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006). 
As mentioned earlier, Putin introduced legislative changes in 2004 which most importantly 
made the appointment of governors a job for the president himself, not a job for the regional 
voters, Putin cited a need to unify the country in the face of terrorist violence, probably 
referring to the situation in Chechnya. The government also started to fight democracy 
promotion groups and those other nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), especially those 
receiving foreign funding and which were not pro-Kremlin. Connected to these changes in 
policy the government removed a possible threat in 2005, when a court sentenced billionaire 
and  energy oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, founder of the oil firm Yukos, to eight years in 
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prison for fraud and tax evasion. And at the same time a parallel tax case was started against 
the company Yukos which led to the transfer of most of its assets to the state-owned Rosneft. 
Khodorkovsky had antagonized and worked against the Kremlin by founding different groups 
from political opposition, and his prosecution has been interpreted as a signal to the others 
that it is not wise to mangle in official government affairs (Freedom House: Country report 
2012) 
Nevertheless, in 2008 the Putin era was over, one would think, as he was constitutionally 
barred from serving a third consecutive term as president. Putin handpicked his successor, 
prime minister Dmitry Medvedev, who won the presidential elections with about 70 percent 
of the total votes. Nevertheless, Medvedev appointed Putin as his prime minister and had a 
dominant role in the Russian government even after he stepped down from presidency.  
Moreover, as Medvedev stepped up as president he spoke of liberal ideas and values, yet little 
was changed in any significant ways in the political system which he inherited from Putin. 
Even though Medvedev spoke of more democracy and liberal values the political stagnation 
continnued and the ongoing violence against the regimes most serious critics continued. 
(Dyrnes 2011, Dyrnes 2012, NTB 2011). 
In 2008 the political leadership in Russia changed the constitution for the first time since 
1993. They now extended the future presidential terms from the normal four to six year 
periods. And as Putin stayed in politics several people saw this as a sign that he would run for 
president in the election of 2012. However, it was also discussed if Medvedev would sit for 
two periods as president before Putin took back the presidency. Nonetheless, this did not 
happen. Medvedev stepped down after serving as president over one period, and Putin is now 
once again President of Russia. Now how this has affected the Russian democracy towards 
lesser competition and participation and it therefore could be said that the country had a 








4.3.3 Government, Parliament and the President. 
In Russia the president has a rather strong position. Formally, he is the head of state and 
controls the political guidelines for domestic and foreign policies. This gives the president 
direct influence on the overall government which is supposed to execute the daily 
management of the country. At the same time the head of state also nominates the prime 
minister and can lead meetings of the government. The president also directly controls the 
ministers of defense, foreign and domestic policy, minister of justice, and the intelligence 
service. The head of each department answers to the president. (Hønneland and Jørgensen 
2006) 
The president also has great influence on the legislative power; he can promote new laws, and 
lay down veto to other laws. Each new law needs to be signed by the president. Yet, what 
according to Fish makes the Russian system semi-presidential is the fact that the Duma has 
the right to reject the president's nominee for prime minister. Nevertheless, the position of the 
Duma is paradoxically rather weak when it comes to this right, as the president can dissolve 
the parliament if it rejects his nominee for the third time. This can maybe explain why the 
Duma  has never rejected the president's choice for prime minister in Russia (Fish 2005).  
Moreover, in Russia the parliament is rather weak in comparison with the president in other 
areas as well. It has for example no actual power over the appointment of ministers; it is only 
there to approve the government which the president appoints. Its main function is to make 
laws, and in this respect it could be argued to be an important institution. Yet it is claimed that 
even if it is an important institution in the constitution, or by name, in practice it does not 
have a real say in the political agenda (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006). At least as long as the 
parliamentary elections are full of coercion and fraud (Fish 2005, Freedom House Country 
Report 2012). It could possibly become an important democratic institution, as it can overrun 
the President's veto when it comes to laws, passing them with a vote of qualified majority of 
two thirds. Yet as long as elections are rigged, the parliament stays an marginal institution, in 
some ways just as the old Soviets (councils) were, which did not have a say in governmental 
decisions.  
Nevertheless, it has not always been like this. In Yeltsin's period as president the parliament 
was much more divided and Yeltsin could not always be sure of support from the parliament. 
And over two thirds of the legislative proposals were passed after being rejected by either the 
59 
 
president or the Federation Council during 1996-1999. However, such things have not 
happened during Putin's rule as he had great influence on the Duma (Hønneland and 
Jørgensen 2006). Without mentioning electoral irregularities, this influence is based on the 
fact that  in 2004 President Putin changes the way governors of the different regions of Russia 
got their positions. From the constitution of 1993 governors were chosen by the people in 
their respected regions. However, now they are directly appointed by the president to ensure 
that the regions are run according to the overall state’s policy (Hønneland and Jørgensen 
2006).  
The Russian parliament consists of two chambers; an upper house and a lower house. The 
upper house is called the Federation Council and has 166 seats. Half of the seats in the upper 
house are appointed by the regional governors, the other half by regional legislatures with a 
strong federal control. The other part of the Russian parliament is called the Duma. It consists 
of 450 representatives from the 83 regions in Russia. These seats are elected according to 
proportional representation on the basis of party-lists. All citizens over the age of 21 can be 
elected into the Duma. However, for parties to get representation in the Duma they need to 
gain a minimum of 7 percent of the overall votes in the country, this threshold has been risen  
from 5 during the 1990's. Also the new laws that deal with elections say that parties that want 
to run in the elections need to have 40 000 members and organizations in half of the 
federation's 83 administrative regions. The number was reduced from 50000 in 2010. 
(Freedom House country report 2012) 
It has to be mentioned that this reduction from 40- to 50 000 members could be seen as 
restrictions being lifted. Moreover,  it is easier to compete and participate in the Russian 
system today. Yet, there are so many irregularities and difficulties with the political system in 
Russia that this is maybe the only sign pointing in the direction towards more democracy. A 
part from this the minimum percentage needed to get seats in the Duma is today seven 
percent, which  makes it difficult for smaller parties to compete and participate in the political 
environment. Just to illustrate this with a Norwegian example, if the Norwegian system had 
the same minimum during the parliament elections of 2009 only three parties would get 
enough votes to get seats in the national parliament. With a 5 percent minimum the 
Norwegian parliament has 6 parties in parliament based on normal mandates (NRK). 
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Moreover, at the end of 2008 the constitution was changed. It now extended the presidential 
period from four to six years, which opened for Putin, who won the presidential elections in 
2012, to rule as president until 2024 as he and Medvedev change positions in government  
(Freedom House Country report 2012). In this respect the Russian system also stands out in 
comparison with other presidential and semi-presidential systems. As most systems have a 
two period limit as president no matter if you step down for a while. Not only can this be seen 
as an exploitation of the system, it most definitely restricts the public's possibility to have a 
say in governmental policy when the electoral cycle is extended. 
Nevertheless, having a system with a strong president is not necessarily seen as a problem in 
the scholarly literature. However, when the constitution, which is supposed to set the rules of 
how laws and power works, in practice, is set aside, it can become a democratic problem. In 
Russia it has taken form as what one can maybe call super-presidentialism (Fish 2005). This 
means that most of the governmental power is centralized around the presidency which 
marginalizes and sets aside the other democratic institutions.  
 
Moreover, another problem with having such a super-presidential system is the fact that 
democracy and its legitimacy are connected to the president and his or hers individual 
performance. This is how open politics and markets are connected to the Yeltsin era and 
chaos. While Putin's rule is viewed as another form or approach of democracy, a Russian one 
(Fish 2005). 
 
Furthermore, the parliament becomes an almost unimportant institution in this kind of a 
system, which can undermine the legitimacy of democracy and the rule of the people as their 
representatives in fact are there just to approve of decisions that have already been made at 
the top level of government. And when one as a scholar, or an inhabitant in the respective 
country, connects this system to and compares it with the old one; it  may seem to be 
surprisingly similar. 
 
The point is that power sharing between the institutions is a sign of both competition and 
participation, and when the parliament is reduced to nearly nothing it becomes a democratic 
problem. One of Dahl's seven criteria in his definition of democracy is that the elected 
officials are supposed to have a certain degree of control over government decisions about 
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policy, and to this do be possible the system needs to have some kind of separation of power. 
Now this power is vested in the officials constitutionally, however, the problems do maybe 
become more clear when one is presented with facts dealing with the way elections are 
conducted in Russia. 
4.3.4 A backlash in political and civil liberties 
Before the presidential election in March 2012 there was also an election to the state Duma in 
December 2011. It was important for the Kremlin that the president still had a majority in the 
national parliament before the presidential elections. The government managed to hold on to 
this majority, which was important so that the parliament still was supportive of the president, 
and thus a marginal agent. However, there were major demonstrations after both elections. It 
was claimed that the regime used large scale electoral fraud to secure victory in both. What is 
striking is that it was maybe not the result people took to the streets to demonstrate against, it 
was the way the regime kept the opposition away from the elections and limited their 
possibility to run for both seats in the Duma and for the presidency. After the Duma elections 
over 30.000 accusations of electoral fraud have been presented, yet no one has ever been held 
responsible for this. Moreover, as Putin and the powers at the Kremlin have control over the 
overall media, they have hammered in one major message to the public: "Putin or chaos". So 
in addition to keeping the opposition away by limiting their access to the elections, the system 
also keeps the opposition out of the media. In addition, the opposition is portrayed as chaos in 
comparison to Putin, which by many appears to be credible based on the late 1990's and the 
changes that followed. This is because of the superpresidential form of governing, which 
connects democracy's legitimacy to the person in charge at the time, not the system in itself. 
(Dragnes 2012, Rodum and Johannessen 2012, Steinar Dyrnes 2012, NTB 2012) 
 
Based on the way elections are conducted political and civil liberties are claimed to be rather 
weak in today's Russia. It is claimed that all of the elections in Russia, from the  2000 
presidential to the Duma in 2007, were carefully engineered by the administration. In the state 
Duma election of 2003 the Kremlin controlled United Russia captured 306 out of 450 seats.  
Backed by the national media and most of the printed newspapers no opponent was able to 
challenge Putin in the presidential election of 2004. He received 71 percent of the total votes , 
while his nearest rival got under 14 percent. Moreover, as already mentioned Putin changed 
the procedure of how the governors were appointed in Russia the same year, as well as started 
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a policy which made it harder for democracy-promoting groups and other NOG's which 
received foreign founding.  
 
In 2007 the election was fixed so that the pro-Kremlin parties would get a majority in the 
lower house. United Russia got 315 of the seats in the Duma, so the parliament kept being an 
institution which approved of policy already made at the top. Furthermore, in the presidential 
election of 2008 state dominance of media made it possible for Vladimir Putin to pass his 
presidential mandate to his handpicked successor Dmitry Medvedev even more easily than 
Yeltsin did when he picked Putin. The two are said to have swapped positions to avoid 
violating the ban on serving as president for more than two consecutive periods.  
 
Heavy manipulation of the elections to the state Duma in December 2011 barely preserved the 
presidential party's majority in the lower house of the parliament. United Russia only captured 
238 seats, but the party still has majority in the lower house as well as in the upper house. 
However, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) reported major 
irregularities during the election. These included media bias and interference by state 
authorities, which ended with tens of thousands of anti-government demonstrators taking to 
the streets to protest against the electoral fraud which was displayed by the Medvedev- Putin 
government. And the same kind of pre-decided election in the parliament took place in the 
presidential election of March 2012, where Putin and Medvedev exchanged positions in 
government again (Freedom House Country report 2012, Fish 2005).  
 
Nevertheless, in the political society which was left behind after the 1990's there was need for 
gathering the political elites both national and regional in a common direction. As the system 
was corrupt and people misused their positions to get more power, it is possible to understand 
why there was need for a strong central government. However, if the government manipulates 
elections, both for president and parliament, democracy is weakened. Electoral fraud aimed at 
getting a parliament that supports the president moves the system away from competition and 
participation, towards less. In this respect the Duma loses its function.  
 
Now, why is the parliament important when one has a powerful president? Well,  as Fish 
claims, the most important aspect for countries in which find themselves within a process of 
democratization, which I argue Russia was during the early 1990s, is that countries with 
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strong parliaments have done better than the ones with weak parliaments. When confronted 
with this theory and the data which I have found it is maybe not unlikely that this applies to 
the case of democratization and a backlash in Russia. 
Moreover,  just as the parliament is supposed to balance the power of a president, a civil 
society is meant to balance a government. This is why it has been seen as important to have a 
system based on political openness where it is possible for people to organize themselves in  
interest groups, political  or other organizations so that civil society can balance the political 
society, and prohibit it to become a dictatorship. According to the data,  in the case of Russia 
the new regime has done exactly the opposite. Putin has restricted the possibility for people to 
stand up against the regime if they in fact do not support the regime and power holders. Note 
that I do not claim that Putin is a dictator, as dictators have a tendency to prohibit the 
existence of a opposition, which  leaves them with a support  of almost a hundred percent at 
elections. Yet, again it is possible to argue that there is a bit of ambivalence when studying 
data from the election, as the situation in Chechnya is different. A region dominated by 
conflict, yet giving all political support to the political enemy in elections. (Freedom House: 
Country Report 2012, Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006). What I am trying to get to is that 
when I consider this data in light of the broader definition of democracy, it becomes 
problematic. It does not look like people's choice necessarily is elected, and weighed equally 
in government, or that the elected officials in parliament have much to say in government 
decisions about policy.   
 
Furthermore, even if the constitution laid the groundwork for freedom of speech, the 
government controls most of the media in Russia, especially all the television networks. Also, 
journalists who are critical towards the power in Kremlin have been victims of brutal attacks, 
and in some cases killed, without any of the people claimed to be the masterminds being 
prosecuted. It could be understood as dangerous for critical journalists to stay in Russia. 
Moreover, laws on extremism have made it possible to stop speeches, organizations and 
activities which do not have official support, making it difficult for people to organize and 
gather in political activities like demonstrations. In cases like these the police are often used 
to stop demonstrations and arrest participants. The same goes for religious gatherings. And I 
think it undermines the fifth point from Dahl's definition of democracy, which says that a 
democratic regime shall guarantee citizens to be able to express themselves without fear even 
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if critical towards the government. (Freedom House Country report 2012, Fish 2005, NTB 
2012) It has to be mentioned that the Internet is used as an example of the opposite, it is free 
and open to all,  yet how much of a power factor it can be opposed to the national media 
coverage I would question nonetheless.  
 
When it comes to religious freedom in today’s Russia, the constitution also in this area 
respects it; however how it actually is implemented is another question. The Christian 
Orthodox Church has a special place in Russia, especially after 2009, when the President 
authorized laws to religious instructions in public school. So where other European and 
western societies separates the state and the church, Russia is bringing them closer together.  
And therefore I argue that after 2009 that there has been movement towards lesser access to 
alternative information and associational autonomy in Russia. (Freedom House: Country 
report 2012). 
 
Moreover, as democratization is a trait based on a increase in competition and participation I 
would argue that one can identify a significant decrease in these aspects after Putin became 
president, based on the centralizing of power and electoral fraud. It can possibly be traced 
back to the period of economical transition. And even if one can claim that today's system is 
more open than in the Soviet era it has become less open than during the beginning of 
Yeltsin's period as president and the government has undermined both other institutions and 
the political- and the civil society. Now some may argue that this centralization was needed, 
as the political system was in chaos. However, as political and civil liberties have been 
restricted by this,  I would rather argue that this has resulted in  a movement away from 
competition and participation from the early Yeltsin period till today, and therefore it has been 
a democratic backlash in Russia.  
When it comes to the elections in Russia the data I have presented paints a dark picture of the 
democratic system. Not only does this show the use of electoral fraud but it is also connected 
to the composition of the parliament. As Fish claims (see the theory chapter) countries with 
strong parliaments have done better in a process of democratization than those with a weak 
parliament. And this also has to do with the legitimacy which is connected to the fact that 
parliaments often reflect the will and composition of the people. When it comes to the 
Russian case these aspects of the Russian society have become weaker these last years. 
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As the Russian constitution according to Fish makes way for a semi presidency in Russia, the 
changes made by Putin have in fact created a super-presidency, which centralized the power, 
and as I argue undermines the possibility for a political opposition something that is an 
important prerequisite of democracy. Nevertheless, to a certain degree the backlash in the 
democratic process could possibly be identified as already beginning when the oligarchs got a 
strong position in governmental policy during the Yeltsin era. I would argue that the 
oligarch's entry in to the political realm undermined the elected officials, and therefore can be 
considered as a sign of democratic recession, and if one agrees with this it could be argued 
that the process of democratization was shorter than scholars believed. 
In the end, one can probably end up questioning whether or not the Russian democracy in fact 
respects several of the features which are important in Dahl's definition of democracy. To me 
it looks like there is little respect for the constitution which lays the groundwork for elected 
officials to have a certain degree of control over government decisions. This is connected to 
the major electoral fraud which has been documented during several of the past elections in 
Russia. This of course also undermines Dahl's criteria for free and fair elections, and the laws 
on elections are in fact  instruments for keeping a possible opposition at bay. 
Moreover, with focus when one considers the part of the theory dealing with democratization 
and institutional problems, it becomes clear that in Russia there are problems with several of 
these "markers". This makes it possible to understand why some scholars talk about a Russian 
Backlash, which has created what seems as a similar system to the old Soviet one. 
To sum this all up and connect it to the expectations mentioned in the early part of this topic  
(see paragraph 4.3.1), there are several markers which point in the direction of, and that 
explains why, scholars talk about backlash  . First of all, what was mentioned was that a 
strong parliament is meant to secure the democratic transition. This is to balance the president 
as well as create a legitimate reflection of the population and their interests. What is more a 
democracy has an electoral cycle which ensures that the mass population can changes people 
in government regularly. To a certain degree these elements of democracy seems to have been 
in place and developing towards more openness during the early 1990s. Yet the new laws on 
NGO's, governors, parliament, and elections,  and electoral fraud have undermined this shift 
and reversed the movement. As well as the new electoral cycles have made longer intervals 
between the elections, which means that the wishes and needs of the people take longer to 
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reach the government. Moreover, there is shown a decrease in the civil society's possibility to 
organize and promote their interests after Putin came to power. All these democratic markers 
can explain why several scholars and organizations like Freedom House talk about a 
democratic backlash in Russia. 
 
4.4.1 The culture as a cause for the Russian backlash 
I have now tried to explain the backlash through the lens of economical development and the 
lens of institutional problems. Yet some scholars try to explain the movement towards lesser 
democracy, hence a democratic backlash, based on a country's political culture. This is what I 
will try to do in this section, to look at the political culture and try to explain the Russian 
backlash in light of it. 
I find it plausible that the Russian regime had signs of attitudinal change and constitutional 
change, however was set back by the fact that a group of people spent significant resources 
attempting to reach their own personal objectives without going through the canal of political 
society. Linz & Stepan see this as the only legitimate place to compete for control and 
regulations. 
If one looks at the Russian westwards policy in the early 1990s through the lens of political 
culture, it could be claimed that the old norms and beliefs were kept in place by not 
establishing a democratic culture nationwide. To a certain degree it could probably be claimed 
that this movement westwards was done through a top-down approach which in itself, as one 
of Inglehart point's, and Welzel, made the democratic transition fragile because of the lack of 
a focus on the mass population and their culture. Like what I choose to call hermeneutic 
process, which include a top-down as well as a bottom- up approach, did not occur. Moreover, 
the point is that it could be claimed that the respect for democratic values at best were 
beginning to take hold in the urban areas of Russia. 
The period where Yeltsin's regime was connected to the oligarchs and corruption at the top 
level of government, could maybe be seen as the most important signs of the beginning of the 
democratic backlash. From democratization towards Dahl's polyarchy (from figure 2), 
towards what Dahl calls a competitive oligarchy. And as I have written earlier in this thesis 
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the ultimate goal has to be reaching  democracy (polyarchy). And therefore reversed the 
attitudinal and constitutional changes in Russia. 
Furthermore, the economic crisis which ended in the collapse of the Ruble can be identified as 
giving way for survival values in Russia. This means that the population as well as the 
government prioritized economical growth and or military security, and gave less priority to 
democratic values. Democratic values became subordinate and made it possible for a 
charismatic leader, like Putin and the way he is portrayed by state media, to strengthen or 
move towards greater control. This is maybe not a surprise as people lacked basic products 
and maybe had harder conditions than during the Soviet era. So, the democratic values came 
second. If one agrees that a democratic culture did not get a foothold in Russia the crisis could 
have brought with it an authoritarian nostalgia. This can be seen as preventing the 
development of a democratic culture in this enormous country, which Russia is, and gave way 
for a charismatic leader to tighten the grip around the governmental powers. In the case of 
Russia this meant that the authoritarian nostalgia along with survival values enabled Putin to 
seize control and suppress any opposition by taking control over all governmental resources, 
in the name of fighting corruption.  
Russia is not the only example of countries in such a transition. As an empirical example for 
these kind of cases where countries were on the verge of a democratic backlash Huntington 
uses several cases from Spain, Portugal, Brazil, Pakistan and to the Philippines. These were 
countries in which disappointment over the democratic transition became widespread. When 
the different military regimes were thrown from their positions, new hope rose. However, 
democracy did not in itself produce solutions for the economic and the social problems in 
these cases. In the end, the response to democracy in these cases was often a form of an 
"authoritarian nostalgia" and the question from the outside world was: would the new regimes 
consolidate or collapse? (Huntington 1991). 
The answer to Huntington's question, is that this is based on two criteria: first, to what extent 
the political elites, and the public, believe that the rulers should be chosen by democratic 
means, and that this would test the democratic (political) culture in the countries. Second, to 
what extent do the elites and the public in fact choose their leaders through elections, which 
he calls a "behavioral test of the institutionalization of democratic practices in the politics of 
the country" (Huntington 1991 p. 259). It is basically the same as what is presented by 
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Inglehart and Welzel when it comes to owning a democratic culture both on a top level and at 
the bottom level of society. 
This issue of developing a democratic culture brings into focus the relationship between the 
effectiveness of a new democratic government and its legitimacy, because a non-democratic 
regime and its culture is based on its efficiency. This means the regime's performance in face 
of problems and how they solve these problems. There is no question of if they have any 
popular legitimacy to do whatever they choose to, but what they deliver. When or if non-
democratic regimes are not able to deliver, it could be possible to predict that unrest might 
occur.  A new democratic regime is not necessarily judged by what they deliver in face of 
economic and security challenges, but rather by how they respond to their inability to solve 
the problems which arise at a given time. As mentioned earlier it is assumed that 
socioeconomic challenges can undermine democratic regimes. However, as Huntington 
explains, democratic regimes did survive the Great Depression in the 1930s. "They survived 
because, in the words of Ekkart Zimmerman, of the ability of group leaders to come together, 
form new coalitions, sometimes on the basis of reaffirming older ones (such as Belgium), and 
then settle on how to steer the economy"  (Huntington 1991 p. 259). 
Huntington goes further to claim that the stability of democratic regimes depends first and 
foremost on the ability of the political elites, party leaders, military leaders and business 
leaders to come together to work out a plan for facing and coping with harsh challenges. And 
it is when a culture like this is not present, one can expect to observe a democratic backlash 
based on what Linz and Stepan calls behavioral, constitutional and attitudinal changes. 
Distinguishing between support for democracy and support for the government that 
democratic election produce are, especially for new democracies, important to remember in a 
democratic transition. I choose to use the same example of governmental dissatisfaction in 
Spain as Huntington did to reflect on  the question of support for democracy, and to explain 
what is meant in the section above dealing with governmental effectiveness and legitimacy in 
relation to political culture: 
 "In the last years of the Franco regime unemployment was among the lowest in 
 Europe (average about 3 percent), and the economic growth rate was one of the 
 highest in the world (average about 7 percent). In the first years of democracy in the 
 late 1970s and early 1980s, unemployment rose to 20 percent and economic growth 
 dropped to less than 2 percent. Confidence in the ability of democracy to resolve these 
 problems varied widely.....In 1978, 77 percent of the Spanish public believed that 
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 democracy was the best political system for Spain. That figure dipped to 69 percent in 
 1980, but rose to 81 percent in 1981, and 85 percent in 1983" (Huntington 1991. p 
 261-262) 
The point of showing these numbers is to show that in a democracy it is not only efficiency 
that creates legitimacy, but also the electoral cycle. With the increasing economic hardship in 
Spain, the public lost faith in the Suarez government, and elected  Felipe Gonzalez and the 
socialists in to office, which resulted in the renewed confidence in that the government could 
solve Spain's problems (Huntington 1991). 
Furthermore, without a democratic culture, or rather another political culture, an authoritarian 
"nostalgia" could create a democratic setback. However in the case of Spain, a backlash did 
not happen because it was believed by both the public and in the political society were that 
democracy still was the best from for government. This could be explained by the notion of a 
democratic culture. Democracy does not mean that problems will be resolved by the regime 
itself, but rather we connect democracy and a democratic culture to the values of being able to 
remove and elect new rulers, which can be claimed to be the essence of democratic behavior. 
This means that new democracies can become consolidated only when the public and the 
elites believe and understand that democracy is the solution to the problem of tyranny, 
however not necessarily to economic or social challenges (Huntington 1991).   
Moreover, this is what the difference between a formal and a genuine democracy: "Elite 
integrity makes the difference between formal democracy and effective democracy- between 
democracy in name only, where elections are held and where civil and political liberties exist 
on paper but the governing elites feel free to ignore people's rights and govern on their own 
behalf; and democracy that is genuinely responsive to mass preferences and respects people's 
civil and political liberties. (Inglehart and Welzel 2005 p. 299) 
Furthermore, in the case of Russia the opposite happened, and political culture, survival 
values and authoritarian nostalgia could be said to help explain why. It seems that Russians 
connect democracy and liberal values to Yeltsin's personal traits and to his period as 
president, and therefore that a democracy like Dahl's  means chaos. It is at least this way it is 
presented by the state owned media today. Putin's fight with the oligarchs and the 
centralization of power around the presidency can be understood as in fact necessary to get rid 
of the corrupt system in Russia where the line between business and politics was removed 
during the 1990s. However, this corrupt system which almost bankrupted Russia and lead to 
the collapse of the ruble also made it possible for Putin to seize control thanks to the 
70 
 
authoritarian nostalgia in the country. Moreover, this is understandable as the public along 
with the political leadership in Russia were dominated by survival values because of the 
economic situation, and the political culture in Russia longed for a strong leader reminiscent 
of the old times. 
However, one of Linz' and Stepan's major points about the Russian case is that a democratic 
culture outside of the sphere of the urban political elite was never built. So the rest of Russia 
still had the 75 years of the Soviet values, norms and traditions in their mind (Linz & Stepan 
1996 p. 376). There has in fact never existed a democratic tradition in Russia, at least not in 
the Western or broader sense. (Hønneland and Jørgensen 2006 p. 15 ) One could maybe see 
the Soviet system as the first system where Russia tried to listen to the people at the grassroots 
level and bringing them and their interests up to the top.  
As I see it, if Russia had a democratic culture the transition after Yeltsin and during Putin may 
not have been carried out by removing or restricting the civil and political liberties. These 
restrictions which today have been the some of the major  reasons for demoting the Russian 
system from "Partly free" to "Not Free" by the Freedom House Index, and the reasons why 
scholars talk about a democratic backlash in Russia. 
5.1.1 Movement from democracy in Russia towards just a “sham”? 
Before moving on to answering the last question of this thesis it could be interesting to have a 
short part about how the Russian system fits in to Dahl's definition of democracy. According 
to Dahl, in order to be defined as a liberal democracy a regime needs to ensure the seven 
points which deals with competition, participation and civil and political liberties. Other 
authors like Inglehart and Welzel claim that regimes that have these guarantees only in 
constitution , not in practice are, in fact what they call fake democracies.  It could also be 
understood that marginalization of one of the concepts: participation, competition or political- 
and civil liberties, which liberal democracies ensure, based on cultural or historical reasons is 
not accepted as legitimate. So, how does the Russian regime fit in to the definition of a liberal 
democracy? 
First, the Russian constitution of 1993 says that Russia is a democratic and republican regime. 
One of the conditions of democracy listed by Dahl is; inclusive suffrage, and in Russia there 
is an almost universal right to vote. Actually, people can run for elected office at the early age 
of 21 years old. There are also relatively frequent conduced elections; the Duma for example 
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earlier sat for a period of four years, and now it sits for a period of five. The president now 
sits for a period of six years between elections. In these respects, the Russian regime fits the 
Dahl's  requirements of democracy, yet this is also where I would argue that it stops fitting his 
conditions. Moreover, this I argue because we can question whether the elections are free and 
fair, and if the parliament really is an institution with influence over the executive power. 
According to the first point listed by Dahl, the power needs to lies in the hands of the elected 
officials. Looking at Russia there are several things that need to be said about this matter. 
Firstly, the President is elected and can be said to represent the overarching political majority. 
However, the Duma is marginalized. Furthermore, during the first years after 1993 the 
regional governors were in fact elected by the people in the different regions. But when the 
laws were changed, and governors started to be appointed by the president resulting in more 
centralized power, the Russian democracy was weakened further. Nevertheless, a strong 
presidency is not a contradiction of liberal democracies. The problem of the Russian regime is 
that there are very weak checks and balances in place for the other powers to control the 
presidential power, which I understand the constitution of 1993 laid the ground-works for. 
Furthermore, the new election laws have created a party system which is favorable to big 
parties. As has earlier been mentioned, it has become difficult for smaller parties to get 
representation because they need to get at least 7 percent of the total votes. This also creates 
problems for smaller parties, especially those who represent a certain region. However, even 
if these laws were to be changed, it could prove to be difficult to become a real opposition to 
the government in power. One of the many reasons could be the fact that the government has 
a tight control over the overall media. This means that for example articles that are critical 
towards the sitting government might not be published. And as mentioned earlier the 
governmental control over the overall media stations in Russia made it possible for Putin to 
handpick his successor. Moreover, the way Putin and Medvedev just swapped positions in the 
presidential election of 2012 could be seen as a confirmation of Russia's political deficit when 
it comes to competition and fairness of elections. This can lead us to see that the Russian 
regime does not fit Dahl’s criteria for free and fair elections, and in light of the fact that the 
state controls the media, this also limits the right to alternative information. 
So,  the fairness and the competition in election are questionable in the Russian democracy. 
True, they have elections and several parties. However, as presented by Freedom House, 
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several elections have been rigged to secure a majority in the lower house which supports the 
president. As already mentioned relation to the media, when it comes to the freedom of 
speech freedom and of assembly, much can be said. I might not even get to touch everything 
on the surface, but some important things might be said about the so called Russian 
democracy. Firstly, in a liberal democracy the institutions of a government need to guarantee 
the citizen’s rights to express themselves, and their opinions without fear. Secondly, a liberal 
democracy values people's freedom of choice, meaning that it  values that people  have access 
to information in general like the Internet or different media, but also that they have access to 
other religious writings or philosophies of life which may go against what the government 
believes in, this including political perspectives. Moreover,  people should have the 
opportunity to organize themselves even if they value other ideas than the government does. 
And according to Freedom House, Fish and others, Russia lacks especially this. In other 
words, when we compare the Russian political regime to Dahl's standards it does not fit in to a 
description of a liberal democracy. To some extent it can even be questioned if it fits a narrow 
definition if both the parliamentary elections and especially the presidential elections are 
already decided, because of electoral fraud. Moreover, scholars like Inglehart and Welzel 
might because of these aspects which I have highlighted call Russia a “sham” democracy. 
6.1.1 An holistic view of the democratic backlash in Russia. 
Up to this point I have presented the different explanatory approaches as isolated theories. 
What I will try now is to answer the last question of this thesis: how the explanations together 
can contribute to our understanding of the case.   
What I have come to so far is that the three approaches all highlight important aspects of what 
is needed to complete a process of democratization and reach a consolidated democracy. The 
lack of these features could possibly be an explanation when it comes to why a country such 
as Russia has experienced a democratic backlash. With this I mean that they have gone from 
an increase in competition and participation based on political rights and civil liberties, to a 
decrease. 
Nevertheless, as I see it, based on the theories which have been presented in this thesis one 
theory alone is not enough to explain and understand the democratic recession Russia has 
experienced.  I argue that the theories are relying, in greater or lesser degree, to touch upon 
the same aspects as the other approaches, and thus using all these theories to create a more 
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holistic or hermeneutic view and understanding is needed. The human world and the world of 
democracy are so complex that one integrated model could be better than three supposedly 
mutually exclusive theories, and thus,  I will try to show that they are rather complement each 
other than exclude one another.  
6.1.2 Economical development, institutions and power and political culture 
It is said that democratization happens when a non-democratic regime undertakes a transition 
towards a more democratic system. In Russia the liberalization during the beginning of the 
Yeltsin era was such a transition like this.  A transition from the old communist regime 
towards a more western liberal one. 
The system became more open for competition and participation. The parliament was not the 
president's puppet, and the regions in Russia could elect their preferred governors. During this 
period of time the different regions in Russia could rule themselves with greater autonomy 
than ever before.  To some degree I would argue that the Russian government started out with 
a liberal project towards a consolidated democracy, and their tool was form of shock-therapy. 
At first the Russian regime had a behaviorally transition where most of the significant 
national actors tried to use democratic institutions like elections and the parliament to promote 
their interests. The problem is that the mass population of Russia was not part of this 
attitudinal  change, it was rather top-down. What I mean is that the reforms were imposed on 
the mass population from the top level of Russian society, it was not a decision which 
everyone stood behind. This was something that made authoritarian nostalgia spread when the 
economic reforms made the standard of living worse. Moreover, when Yeltsin turned away 
from this shock-therapy, the liberal project, he also turned his back to the constitutional ways 
of governing. The people of Russia were subjected to the national laws differently, depending 
on political and economical resources. This also made the line between public and private life 
blurry, as the oligarchs had power over public policies. Corruption became widespread 
throughout  all levels of society. 
Furthermore, when Putin came to power I have argued that there had already been  a turn 
towards less democracy because of the oligarch's entry in to the political sphere. Putin's 
reforms where synonymous with the centralizing of power and there were good reasons for 
that. He inherited a chaotic system full of corruption. Nevertheless, this did not turn the 
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system back on a democratic "track". Rather, it gave the system a push in the wrong direction, 
and made the backlash even bigger, as electoral fraud restricted the opposition's possibility  to 
meddle in official policy and politics. 
To isolate my case and only use one of the explanations for the Russian backlash could in fact 
make it difficult to understand why it happened. Moreover, it can create a picture which 
indicates an easy explanation and therefore also an easy fix. However, when having a more 
holistic view of the Russian case it becomes clear, that just like I understand Robert Cox 
about the world of social research and interaction, democracy is so complex that having only 
one point of view, one is not able to see the bigger picture. To illustrate this I would like to go 
through all three approaches as connected to one another. 
 Let me start with the highlights of the economic development. There was little allocation of 
the resources from the old power structure after the shock therapy. Even if the resources were 
allocated to the people now often know as the oligarchs, most of them had high government 
positions in the Soviet regime. As shown by the data, around two thirds of the major 
enterprises were sold to the managers who sat at the top of the respective enterprise. 
Furthermore, when these economically powerful people stepped into politics the divide 
between the political and private sphere was changed. This I would argue weakened the 
Russian democracy as the elected officials became marginalized contra the economical actors. 
However, this changed when Putin came to power. He centralized the government and 
removed the oligarchs from politics.  Paradoxically, this made it harder for a strong and 
independent middle class to rise as government control became even tighter. When it comes 
to the small business startup, the ambivalence of the reforms between the Yeltsin era and 
Putin era made it harder for people to succeed since bribes became a normal way of doing 
business in Yeltsin's period as president. So a strong civil society did not rise like expected by 
the shock-therapists.  
So, what the theory of economical development and backlashes in a process of 
democratization can explain the following: When resources are not allocated and remain in 
governmental control it becomes impossible for a independent middle class to arise because 
the middle class, and the mass population, stays dependent on the government as they 
distribute the economic resources. And the government can stop and "squeeze" anyone who 
would want to stand up against it. Moreover, as there is no power outside of the political 
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center of power, it becomes possible for some to undermine competition and participation, 
and therefore weaken the democracy.   
As the economical aspect can highlight how resource allocation can affect the creation of an 
independent middle class, I would argue that it therefore also affects both the mass population 
and the middle class' possibility to participate and compete in the political society. 
Burkart and de Soysa claims that opening up the economy has a stronger effect on 
democratization rather than the other way around. Is it possible to identify that such an effect 
happen during the Yeltsin era? To some degree it might be possible to identify some 
arguments for this claim. As regional governments had more to say in their respective region 
after the liberalization project started, and as the power structure between the central 
government and the regional ones were more horizontal rather than vertical, like it is today. 
However, I would argue that this was rather a political initiative than an economical effect in 
Russia. Yet, it was part of the idea for greater liberalization which is a part of the economic 
theory.  
Nevertheless, as I see it,  the old structures from the Soviet era stayed intact as the managers 
of the enterprises got formal ownership over these. As a result an increasing and big 
industrialization and private production did not happen as predicted by the shock-therapists. 
Something that is said to should have made the society more complex and diverse. Diversity 
and complexity are two features which are supposed to make it harder for an authoritarian 
control. I will try not to take a stand about whether Russia is authoritarian per se, however I 
base my thesis on the demotion by Freedom House, from "partly free" to "not free". 
Nevertheless, what I at least can say is that the economical growth in Russia happened after 
the end of the Yeltsin era, and that the only independent power outside of the political elites 
were the oligarchs, which now are marginalized and the Russian system is left with a regime 
based on full central control. 
Yet, one of the aspects of a successful democratization which is mentioned in the theory is 
that basic survival needs have to be in place before people can have a change in attitude. So 
the economical recession which one can observe after the end of the Soviet regime made it 
impossible for liberal values to get a foothold in the Russian society. However, we can 
question whether Russia would have been more democratic if the liberal project was kept 
going when oil and gas prices went "through the roof",  after Putin became president. 
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What is sure is that even if the liberalization was set in motion in Russia, one of the most 
important aspects of economical theory can be questioned if came to be, a liberal market 
based on a consumer model. I would argue that the way the allocation was done to the 
oligarchs did keep the producers in control, rather than transferring economical power to 
consumers. To be able to do this, one of course needs a consumer base which often are 
represented by the middle class. However, the economical capitalism did not get a fundament 
in Russia. During the Yeltsin era, the oligarchs demanded to be heard, which undermined the 
elected officials. And during the Putin era, no one is heard as the middle class is kept almost 
marginal and the political society is kept at bay as there are reports of extensive electoral 
fraud. To me it looks as if the liberal changes in Russia ended up with being anticommunist 
rather than democratic, as Przeworski argued there was a risk of happening in the post 
communist transitions. 
One of the many reasons I would use to explain the democratic backlash in Russia is based on 
state control. It is argued that an open economy lessens the state's control over its citizens, 
which in turn makes it possible for a political opposition to arise. As the Russian state still has 
the economical initiative, this opposition cannot become a force in their society, because it is 
dependent on founds for election campaigns. However as NGO's resource allocations are 
made almost impossible there is no way for Russians today to found an independent and 
critical opposition. "No middle class no democracy". So as Przeworski predicts the reforms 
and the democracy have been undermined, and the old power structure is maintained. 
Nevertheless, even if the economical theory can to some degree explain a democratic 
backlash based on the lack of a "bourgeois" which could stand up against and check and 
balance the government, it cannot explain why the power relationship between the political 
institutions and the civil society is a democratic problem and how this results in a democratic 
backlash. Its strength is to show how a consumer economy creates a complex society which 
makes it possible for a middle class to become a important part of the political picture, and 
how the lack of this makes it possible for a government to return to undemocratic ways. Yet it 
can be put in to question whether the lack of resource allocation and a liberal economy can 
explain enough alone, as a middle class alone does not create democracy. It does not explain 
how the economy can affect culture and political institutions, or vice versa. This is why there 
is need for explanations focusing on other aspects as well. 
77 
 
As argued by the institutional theory, the parliament is an important political institution, and 
Fish claims countries in a democratic transition with strong parliaments have done better than 
those with weak ones. I have argued that the Russian parliament is weak as elections have 
been subject to long term fraud, to keep it loyal to the president. New laws have made it 
possible for the president to pick his governors who, in turn, picks officials for the upper 
house, something which was not possible under presidential control during the liberalization 
in the Yeltsin era. These aspects have undermined the legitimacy of the elected officials and 
are one of the reasons why scholars talk about a Russian backlash. As well as electoral fraud, 
the civil society in Russia has been kept at bay because of the new laws, which makes it 
possible for the government to crack down on organizations and protests critical towards the 
government.  The freedom of speech can be said to have been restricted, something that is 
often connected to state control over the national media coverage. Furthermore, the Russian 
system does not guarantee the democratic aspects which are highlighted as important features 
if a political system is to be defined as a democracy today. These markers can show a 
systematic decrease in openness based on restrictions of participation and competition from 
the Yeltsin era throughout the Putin era. 
Nevertheless, even if it can explain the backlash on the basis of all these democratic aspects, it 
does not create a clear picture of why the mass population have let it happen. This is easier to 
understand when one looks at Russia through the lens of economics and or political culture. 
Based on what I have found, one of the most important aspects of the Russian backlash is that 
the economic collapse in Russia created survival values which placed the democratic values in 
the shadow of values like economic growth and military security. This made it possible for 
the government to undermine democracy and make the system less open. As a result, Russia 
has experienced a backlash or recession in democracy.  
This was possible because the liberalization during the beginning of the Yeltsin era had a top-
down approach, yet it therefore lacked focus on the internal ownership of democracy by the 
rest of the population. As the economic crisis hit Russia the system relapsed because of what 
has been called authoritarian nostalgia. The lack of a democratic culture in Russia can be said 
to have triggered an authoritarian nostalgia, which in turn caused the democratic backlash 




In the end, what I have tried to present is that the process of democratization is a complex 
matter, and when there is a democratic backlash it is difficult to put a finger on exactly why. 
What has been most important for the Russian backlash is hard to point out. I would rather 
say that an integrated model can shed light on the bigger picture as one gets the impression 
that the different explanations to a certain degree are intertwined, and make more sense when 
considered together. This makes me think that multidisciplinary research is just as important, 
as such research can create a bigger picture than an analysis based only in economical, 
political or cultural explanations. As a particular theoretical perspective emphasizes a set of 
explanations and present what it regards as the most significant ones. And therefore focus less 
on other aspects. Another perspective would emphasize something else, in this thesis it takes 
the form of a cultural perspective, a economic one and a institutional one. Moreover, I 
therefore argue that when trying to get an overview or an overall understanding of a case of a 
democratic backlash, like the one in Russia, using multiple explanations does this better than 
just using one perspective. Yet it also has to be said that different perspectives will contribute 
to the overall understanding in different ways, not necessarily equally, yet a study like this 
could possibly be too big for a master thesis. Nevertheless, using all three theories presented 















What I have tried to answer is: When scholars around the world now talk about the Russian 
democratization process , they talk about a "Russian Backlash".  - 1) What is meant by this? 
2) What are the main explanations of the phenomenon? 3) And how do these explanations 
together contribute to our understanding of the Russian case? I had a special focus on the last 
two as they are the most important questions. 
First of all, I have tried to explain what is meant by democratization and backlashes, based on 
the fact that democratization is happening when a system is moving towards more 
participation and competition. These aspects have been covered by Robert A. Dahl's seven 
points of what constitutes as a democracy. When scholars talk about a democratic backlash, 
they mean a movement from more openness towards less. In other words a democratic 
backlash takes place when a process of democratization stops and moves backwards. When 
scholars talks about a "Russian Backlash" they mean that the Russian system has moved from 
a increase in competition and participation, based on political rights and civil liberties, to a 
decrease. This is why the Freedom House Index has demoted the Russian system from "Partly 
Free" to "Not Free". 
Second, the thesis has presented three different approaches which try to explain this 
democratic backlash. These explanations are based on; economical development, institutional 
problems and political culture respectively. 
The economical theory explains the democratic backlash in Russia by focusing on the lack of 
allocation of resources, which made it impossible for a strong and independent middle class to 
arise in Russia. This means that it could not become a part of the political arena and could not 
check and balance  the government as the civil society still is dependent of governmental 
resources. 
Moreover, the institutional theory explains the backlash based on electoral fraud which has 
lessened the parliament's power and has become a democratic problem. Furthermore, as new 
laws restricting both the possibility for an opposition, and at the same time as some laws have 
centralized power, the legitimacy of the Russian democracy has suffered. The weakened 
legitimacy of the parliament has been used to explain why scholars talk about a democratic 
recession, as the Duma had more power during the early 1990s. In addition, the governmental 
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control over the media coverage in Russia has been a subject to great deal of critique. As the 
media bias makes it possible for the Kremlin to control the picture presented to the overall 
population. All in all, there are signs of weakening significance of several aspects of Dahl's 
seven points of democracy. Especially when it comes to "Free and fair elections", "Freedom 
of expression", "Alternative information" and "associational autonomy". 
The last approach explains the democratic backlash through the lens of political culture. 
Using this approach it becomes clear that the democratic culture in Russia was at best 
implemented with a top-down approach. But Scholars like Inglehar and Welzel claim that 
there is need for the mass population to adopt this culture at the same time. As the 
liberalization during the 90's was a product of a top political initiative, this could explain why 
Russia had a authoritarian nostalgia when the country had a economical crisis in the end of 
the same decade. 
To me the democratic backlash or recession in Russia is a complex mater, and trying to 
understand it through just one explanation seems impossible. There are so many aspects 
which have contributed to the movement from an increase in participation and competition 
during the beginning of the Yeltsin era, to a decrease towards its end, and during President 
Putin's reign. I have tried to argue that the lack of a middle class has made it possible for the 
government to seize control over the resources which means that there has not been an 
allocation of resources to the private sector which is needed if the middle class is supposed to 
rise and become an important actor on the political arena.  
Together with these explanations, the electoral fraud and the marginalization of the parliament 
has weakened the Russian democracy and created less openness. As well as the new laws 
made during the Putin and Medvedev era have tightened governmental power and control. 
Yet, this has been possible because of the political culture in Russia. As there was only a top-
down democratization and liberalization during the first year of shock therapy. This made 
way for what is called an authoritarian nostalgia when the economic chaos ended with the 
collapse of the Ruble. This tightened control was then enabled by the dominance of survival 
values which made the democratic values come second, which arguably is strongly connected 
to the economical aspects of democratization. 
The three theories give meaning by themselves, however I see them as intertwined rather than 
mutually exclusive. Together they create a more holistic understanding, this is why I have 
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used the term hermeneutics to explain what I mean. As one part lights up one aspect of the 
backlash, the other theory lets one understand another part of this complex case. And together 
all three contributes to a more holistic or integrated understanding of why scholars talk about 
a Russian backlash. 
Based on this thesis it could possibly be claimed that a democracy as Dahl defines it, never 
came to be in Russia. There was an attempt to liberalize the economy to create a complex 
society, however this was stopped during the first year. Never giving the democratic 
institutions and values the chance to get a foothold both at the top level, and neither in the 
mass population. However ,there are signs that there was an increase of participation and 
competition during the start of the 1990's, yet ever since the middle of the decade  a decrease.  
 
To end this thesis I would like to quote the former Russian Prime minster (1992-1998) Viktor 
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